Catastrophic yield risks and the demand for crop insurance in Finland by Liesivaara, Petri
		
 
 
 
Natural resources and 
bioeconomy 
studies 9/2017 
Catastrophic yield risks and the de-
mand for crop insurance in Finland 
Doctoral Dissertation 
Petri Liesivaara 
	 
Natural resources and bioeconomy studies 9/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Catastrophic yield risks and the demand 
for crop insurance in Finland 
 
Doctoral Dissertation 
 
 
Petri Liesivaara 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Academic dissertation 
 
To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Agriculture and Forestry of the University 
of Helsinki, for public examination in Lecture hall B2, Forest Sciences building (Latokartanon-
kaari 7) of the University of Helsinki on March 31th 2017, at 12 o’ clock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		
 
Natural Resources Institute Finland, Helsinki 2017 
	 
 
Supervisors: 
Professor Sami Myyrä 
Natural Resources Institute Finland (Luke), Helsinki, Finland 
 
Pre examiners: 
 
Professor Jarkko Niemi 
Natural Resources Institute Finland (Luke), Helsinki, Finland 
 
Dr. Ir. Marcel van Asseldonk 
Wageningen Economic Research, Wageningen University & Research, The Nether-
lands 
 
Opponent: 
 
Professor Ashok Mishra  
The Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, Louisiana State Universi-
ty, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, The United States 
 
Custos: 
Professor Antonios Rezitis 
Department of Economics and Management, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland 
 
 
 
Authors contact-info: 
Petri Liesivaara 
petri.liesivaara@gmail.com 
+358 50 338 3674 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
ISBN: 978-952-326-361-1 (Print) 
ISBN: 978-952-326-362-8 (Online) 
ISSN 2342-7647 (Print) 
ISSN 2342-7639 (Online)  
URN: http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-952-326-362-8 
Copyright: Natural Resources Institute Finland (Luke) 
Author: Petri Liesivaara 
Publisher: Natural Resources Institute Finland (Luke), Helsinki 2017 
Year of publication: 2017 
Cover photo: Mikael Lehtonen 
Printing house and: publishing sales: Juvenes Print, http://luke.juvenesprint.fi 
Natural resources and bioeconomy studies 9/2017	
 3	
Abstract 
Petri	Liesivaara,	Natural	Resources	Institute	Finland	(Luke)	
	
	
Crop	insurance	markets	are	affected	by	unpredictable	weather	conditions.	Yield	risks	are	
systemic	and	insurers	face	asymmetric	 information	problems.	Thus,	public	 intervention	
is	often	a	necessity	for	the	development	of	private	crop	insurance	markets.	The	empha-
sis	in	crop	damage	compensation	in	the	EU	is	moving	from	government-run	programmes	
and	disaster	relief	to	insurances	based	on	public–private	partnership	(PPP).	The	Europe-
an	Union	(EU)	is	promoting	the	use	of	PPP	in	the	Common	Agricultural	Policy	(CAP).	Be-
fore	2015	member	states	had	the	opportunity	to	finance	crop	insurance	premium	subsi-
dies	from	national	budget	under	Article	68	of	Pillar	one	regulation.	From	2015	onwards,	
member	states	have	had	the	option	to	co-finance	premium	subsidies	with	the	EU	under	
the	conditions	defined	in	the	regulation	(EU)	No	1305/2013	on	support	for	rural	devel-
opment.	
A	publicly	funded	and	administered	Crop	Damage	Compensation	(CDC)	scheme	was	
designed	to	cover	yield	losses	in	Finland.	The	scheme	was	free	of	charge	for	the	farmers.	
However,	 the	CDC	system	suffered	 from	major	moral	hazard	problems,	because	many	
farmers	collected	payments	on	a	regular	basis.	In	addition,	because	compensation	pay-
ments	were	based	on	individual	farm	yields	compared	with	regional	average	yields,	the	
CDC	system	did	not	cover	farmers	operating	at	high	yield	levels.	Thus,	the	scheme	also	
suffered	from	basis	risk.	As	a	result	of	European	Commission	objection	and	obvious	defi-
ciencies	in	the	CDC	system,	the	programme	was	abolished	in	the	end	of	2015.	A	new	risk	
management	tool	built	on	public–private	partnership	(PPP)	covering	crop	damage	losses	
in	Finland	was	considered	from	2016	onwards.	However,	the	Finnish	government,	in	co-
operation	with	 insurance	 companies	 and	 farmers’	 organisations,	 decided	 not	 to	 intro-
duce	 premium	 subsidies	 for	 crop	 insurance.	 The	 objective	was	 to	 give	 room	 for	 com-
pletely	private	solutions	in	insuring	against	crop	losses.		
The	aim	of	this	thesis	study	was	to	provide	empirical	 information	for	the	develop-
ment	of	crop	in-surance	markets	in	Finland.	More	specifically,	the	objectives	were	to	1)	
study	farmers’	preferences	and	willingness	to	pay	(WTP)	for	crop	insurance	attributes,	2)	
reveal	 the	 effects	 of	 the	price	 anchoring	problem	 in	 crop	 insurance,	 3)	 provide	 guide-
lines	for	government	disaster	relief	 in	combination	with	crop	 insurances,	4)	 investigate	
the	 factors	underlying	crop	 insurance	uptake	and	5)	 study	 the	 feasibility	of	 index	crop	
insurance	based	on	area	yields	in	Finland.	The	research	results	were	ex-pected	to	bene-
fit	farmers,	the	government	and	insurance	companies.	
An	 extensive	 farm	 survey	was	 conducted	 to	 reveal	 Finnish	 farmers’	 demand	 and	
WTP	 for	 crop	 insurance.	 Because	 crop	 insurance	markets	 do	 not	 exist	 in	 Finland,	 the	
demand	and	 farmers’	 preferences	 for	 crop	 insurance	attributes,	 namely	 the	price,	 de-
ductible,	 expected	 compensation	 and	 insurance	 type,	 were	 analysed	 with	 the	 Choice	
	4 
Experiment	 (CE)	method.	 In	addition,	a	split	sample	approach	was	applied	to	the	price	
anchoring	problem	and	to	examine	the	effect	of	government	disaster	relief	on	crop	in-
surance	schemes.	
The	obtained	 results	 revealed	 that	 there	 is	demand	 for	 crop	 insurance	 in	Finland.	
An	insurance	product	was	chosen	in	46.5%	of	the	cases	in	the	entire	CE	dataset.	Price	of	
insurance	is	the	main	factor	affecting	the	choice	to	insure	and	the	demand	was	found	to	
be	 inelastic	over	the	whole	price	range.	The	median	WTP	of	Finnish	farmers	for	a	10%	
increase	 in	 the	deductible	was	 -1.60	 Euros/ha,	 and	 if	 the	 expected	 compensation	was	
increased	by	100	Euros,	farmers’	WTP	increased	by	3.40	Euros/ha.	
The	results	suggest	that	the	crop	insurance	markets	that	are	starting	to	emerge	in	Fin-
land	are	dominated	by	knowledge	of	premium	setting.	Private	crop	insurance	companies	
can	take	advantage	of	this	anchoring	problem,	and	support	targeted	at	farmers	will	be	
easily	 transferred	 elsewhere.	 Farmers’	 knowledge	 of	 fair	 premiums	 and	 the	 ability	 to	
compare	 different	 crop	 insurance	 products	 is	 essential.	 Thus,	 increasing	 awareness	
among	farmers	of	crop	insurance	products	would	be	more	efficient	than	supporting	crop	
insurance	with	fixed	percentages,	and	more	value	for	subsidies	would	be	gained	through	
research	and	extension	services.		
Analysis	of	farmers’	WTP	for	crop	insurance	products	revealed	that	they	are	more	
concerned	about	 the	expected	 compensation	 and	price	 attribute.	 Thus,	 increasing	 the	
deductible	 did	 not	 lower	 farmers’	WTP	 in	 relative	 terms	 as	much	 as	 lowering	 the	 ex-
pected	 compensation.	 This	 is	 an	 encouraging	 result	 for	 the	 development	 of	 public–
private	 crop	 insurance	 products	 in	 Finland,	 as	 the	 strict	 deduct-ible	 limits	 set	 out	 for	
subsidised	crop	insurance	by	the	EU	and	World	Trade	Organisation	(WTO)	will	not	pose	
a	major	obstacle	to	crop	insurance	demand	in	Finland.		
The	demand	for	crop	insurance	is	not	only	affected	by	farm	and	farmer	characteris-
tics	and	crop	 insurance	attributes,	but	also	by	exogenous	 factors.	Our	 results	 revealed	
that	government	 involvement	 in	crop	 insurance	markets	would	reduce	the	WTP	of	the	
deductible	attribute,	leading	to	an	overall	smaller	WTP	for	crop	insurance.	Thus,	in	order	
for	 the	 crop	 insurance	market	 to	evolve	 in	 Finland,	 the	government	 should	either	pay	
disaster	relief	payments	and	refrain	from	insurance	premium	sub-sidies	or	introduce	an	
insurance	premium	subsidy,	but	refrain	from	disaster	relief	payments.	
Of	the	farm	and	farmer	characteristics,	age	was	found	to	be	a	negative	and	signifi-
cant	factor	in	the	choice	to	insure	against	crop	losses.	This	suggests	that	younger	farm-
ers	 are	more	 likely	 to	 choose	 insurance	 in	 Finland.	 The	number	of	 cultivated	hectares	
was	 found	 to	 be	 positive	 and	 significant.	 Thus,	 bigger	 farms	 are	more	 likely	 to	 insure	
against	crop	 losses.	Moreover,	educated	 farmers	are	more	 likely	 to	choose	crop	 insur-
ance.	 It	 was	 also	 found	 that	 risk-averse	 and	 risk-neutral	 farmers	 were	 less	 likely	 to	
choose	 crop	 insurance	 than	on	 average.	 This	 result	 is	 surprising,	 as	 in	 expected	utility	
theory	it	is	assumed	that	a	risk-averse	decision	maker	always	fully	insures.	It	may	be	that	
risk-averse	 farmers	already	use	other	means	 to	handle	 crop	 risks,	which	 reduces	 their	
need	for	crop	insurance.	
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We	also	 found	evidence	of	an	adverse	selection	problem	 in	 future	crop	 insurance	
schemes	 in	 Finland.	 The	 results	 demonstrated	 that	 farmers	 who	 have	 received	 CDC	
payments	 in	the	past	are	more	 likely	to	choose	crop	 insurance.	This	 implies	that	 insur-
ance	 companies	 need	 to	 take	 the	 adverse	 selection	 problem	 into	 account	 in	 actuarial	
practices.	
The	results	from	this	study	also	suggest	that	the	EU	should	consider	subsidies	for	a	
wider	 range	 of	 risk	management	 tools.	 This	 is	 because	 farmers	 preferred	 index	 insur-
ance	over	farm-specific	insurance.	The	study	on	the	feasibility	of	area	yield	index	insur-
ance	in	Finland	revealed	that	its	overall	efficiency	is	not	high,	as	half	of	the	farms	would	
not	gain	any	benefit	from	it.	Because	high	basis	risk	related	to	index	insurance,	the	rules	
for	subsidisation	of	crop	insurance	should	be	relaxed	in	EU	legislation	in	order	for	area	
yield	 index	 insurance	 to	 be	 eligible	 for	 support	 as	 a	 public–private	 crop	 insurance	
scheme	in	Finland.		
	
Keywords:	crop	insurance,	choice	experiment,	disaster	relief,	willingness	to	pay,	mixed	
logit	model,	stochastic	simulation,	index	insurance,	price	anchoring	
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Tiivistelmä 
Arvaamattomat	sääolosuhteet	vaikuttavat	satovakuutusten	markkinoihin.	Satoriskit	ovat	
luonteeltaan	 systeemisiä	 ja	 vakuutusyhtiöt	 kohtaavat	markkinoilla	 epäsymmetrisen	 in-
formaation	ongelmia.	Usein	 julkinen	 interventio	on	välttämätöntä	satovakuutusmarkki-
noiden	kehittymiselle.	Painopiste	satovahinkojen	korvaamisesta	on	Euroopan	unionissa	
(EU)	 siirtymässä	 katastrofiavusta	 satovakuutuksiin	 ja	 satovakuutusmaksujen	 valtion	
tukeen.	 EU	 edistää	 satovakuutusmarkkinoiden	 syntymistä	 Yhteisessä	 maatalouspolitii-
kassa	 (YMP).	 Ennen	 vuotta	 2015	 satovakuutuksia	 on	 voinut	 tukea	 kansallisesta	
budjetista	 osana	 YMP:n	 ensimmäistä	 pilaria.	 Vuodesta	 2015	 alkaen	 jäsenvaltioilla	 on	
ollut	mahdollisuus	ottaa	käyttöön	EU:n	ja	jäsenmaiden	yhteisesti	rahoittaman	asetuksen	
(EU)	No	1305/2015	mukaisen	vakuutusmaksutuen	osana	maaseudun	kehittämistä.	
Suomessa	 julkisesti	 rahoitettu	 ja	 hallinnoitu	 satovahinkojen	 korvausjärjestelmä	oli	
suunniteltu	 kattamaan	 viljelijöiden	 satomenetykset.	 Viljelijöille	 järjestelmään	 osallis-
tuminen	 oli	 ilmaista.	 Satovahinkokorvaus	 järjestelmä	 kärsi	 suurista	 moraalikadon	
ongelmista,	 sillä	 monet	 viljelijät	 saivat	 korvauksia	 useina	 perättäisinä	 vuosina.	 Tämän	
lisäksi	 ongelmana	 oli,	 etteivät	 korkealla	 satotasolla	 toimineet	 viljelijät	 saaneet	 suojaa	
järjestelmästä,	 sillä	 satovahinkokorvaukset	 perustuivat	 alueellisiin	 keskisatoihin.	 Eu-
roopan	 komission	 vastustuksen	 ja	 järjestelmän	 ilmeisten	 puutteiden	 vuoksi	 ohjelma	
lakkautettiin	 vuonna	 2015.	 Uusi	 satovahinkojen	 korvaamiseen	 tähtäävä	 työkalu	 pe-
rustuen	 satovakuutusten	 tuelle	 suunniteltiin	olevan	käytössä	Suomessa	vuodesta	2016	
alkaen.	Valtio	kuitenkin	päätti	olla	ottamatta	käyttöön	vakuutusmaksutukea.	Päätöksen	
tavoitteena	oli	antaa	 tilaa	 täysin	yksityisiin	satovakuutustuotteisiin	perustuville	markki-
noille.		
Tämän	tutkimuksen	tavoitteena	oli	tuottaa	empiiristä	tietoa	satovakuutusten	mark-
kinoista	 Suomessa.	 Tarkemmin	 päämääränä	 oli	 1)	 selvittää	 viljelijöiden	 preferenssit	 ja	
maksuhalukkuus	 satovakuutuksista,	 2)	 paljastaa	 hinta-ankkuroinnin	 vaikutus	maksuha-
lukkuuteen,	 3)	 antaa	 suosituksia	 valtion	 katastrofiavulle,	 4)	 tutkia	 satovakuutuksen	
ostamiseen	vaikuttavia	tekijöitä	ja	5)	tutkia	aluesatoihin	perustuvan	indeksivakuutuksen	
toimivuutta	 Suomessa.	 Tutkimustulosten	odotettiin	edistävän	 satovakuutusten	markki-
noiden	 syntymistä	 Suomessa	 ja	 hyödyttävän	 suomalaisia	 viljelijöitä,	 valtiota	 ja	 vakuu-
tusyhtiöitä.		
Tutkimusaineisto	 kerättiin	 viljelijäkyselyllä	 kysynnän	 ja	 viljelijöiden	 maksuhaluk-
kuuden	selvittämiseksi.	Suomessa	ei	ole	ollut	satovakuutusten	markkinoita.	Tästä	syystä	
satovakuutusten	 kysyntää	 ja	 viljelijöiden	 maksuhalukkuutta	 satovakuutusten	 eri	
ominaisuuksista,	hinnasta,	omavastuusta,	odotettavissa	olevista	korvauksista	sekä	sato-
vakuutuksen	tyypistä,	selvitettiin	valintakoemenetelmällä.		
Tutkimustulokset	 osoittivat,	 että	 satovakuutuksille	 on	 kysyntää	 Suomessa.	 Vakuu-
tustuote	 valittiin	 46,5	 %	 tapauksista	 koko	 valintakoeaineistossa.	 Vakuutustuotteiden	
kysyntä	 riippuu	 tuotteiden	 hinnasta,	 mutta	 hintajousto	 on	 pieni	 koko	 hintavälillä.	 Su-
omalaisten	 viljelijöiden	 maksuhalukkuuden	 mediaani	 omavastuun	 kasvattamisesta	 10	
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prosentilla	oli	 -1,60	euroa.	Odotettavissa	olevien	korvausten	maksuhalukkuuden	medi-
aani	oli	3,40	euroa,	kun	korvausta	korotettiin	100	eurolla/hehtaari.		
Tulokset	 viittaavat	 siihen,	 että	 Suomessa	 kehittymässä	 oleviin	 satovakuutusten	
markkinoihin	 vaikuttaa	 tieto	 satovakuutusten	 hintatasosta.	 Yksityiset	 vakuutusyhtiöt	
voivat	 hinnoittelussaan	 käyttää	 hyväksi	 viljelijöiden	 hinta-ankkurointia	 ja	 satovakuu-
tuksille	 mahdollisesti	 maksettava	 tuki	 siirtyy	 helposti	 pois	 viljelijöiltä.	 Viljelijöiden	
käsitykset	 satovakuutusten	hintatasoista	 ja	 kyky	 vertailla	 erilaisten	 vakuutustuotteiden	
ominaisuuksia	on	olennaista.	 Tiedon	 lisääminen	 ja	neuvontapalveluiden	vahvistaminen	
olisikin	 tehokkaampaa	 kuin	 satovakuutusten	 tukeminen	 etukäteen	 määritetyllä	
tukiprosentilla.	
Analyysi	 viljelijöiden	maksuhalukkuudesta	osoitti,	että	viljelijät	ovat	enemmän	hu-
olissaan	 odotettavissa	 olevista	 korvauksista	 kuin	 omavastuusta.	Omavastuun	 kasvatta-
minen	ei	alentanut	viljelijöiden	maksuhalukkuutta	suhteessa	yhtä	paljon	kuin	odotetta-
vissa	 olevien	 korvausten	 pienentäminen.	 Tämä	 on	 rohkaiseva	 tulos	 satovakuutusten	
markkinoiden	kehittymisen	kannalta	Suomessa,	sillä	tuetuille	satovakuutuksille	asetettu	
omavastuun	 vähimmäismäärä	 EU:ssa	 ja	Maailman	 kauppajärjestössä	 (WTO)	 ei	 aiheuta	
merkittävää	estettä	satovakuutusten	kysynnälle.		
Tutkimuksen	 tulokset	 myös	 paljastivat,	 että	 valtion	 tarjoama	 katastrofiapu	
pienentää	 viljelijöiden	 maksuhalukkuutta	 omavastuusta.	 Näin	 ollen	 valtion	 tulisi	 joko	
tukea	 satovahinkovakuutuksia,	 mutta	 pidättäytyä	 katastrofiavusta	 tai	 vaihtoehtoisesti	
myöntää	katastrofiapua,	mutta	pidättäytyä	satovakuutusten	tukemisesta.		
Maatilaa	ja	viljelijöitä	koskevista	ominaisuuksista	iällä	todettiin	olevan	negatiivinen	
vaikutus	 satovakuutusten	 kysyntään.	 Tämä	 viittaa	 siihen,	 että	 nuoret	 viljelijät	 ovat	
todennäköisempiä	 hankkimaan	 satovakuutuksen.	 Tilan	 koolla	 oli	 positiivinen	 vaikutus	
satovakuutusten	 kysyntään.	 Suuret	 tilat	 vakuuttaisivat	 keskimääräistä	 todennäköisem-
min	 satonsa.	 Myös	 koulutettujen	 viljelijöiden	 ja	 satovakuutusten	 ostamisen	 välillä	
todettiin	positiivinen	suhde.	Tutkimuksessa	myös	löydettiin,	että	riskiä	karttavat	ja	risk-
ineutraalit	 viljelijät	 valitsivat	 satovakuutustuotteen	 keskimääräistä	 harvemmin.	 Tämä	
tulos	on	yllättävä,	sillä	odotetun	hyödyn	teorian	mukaan	riskiä	karttava	päätöksentekijä	
vakuuttaa	 tuotantonsa,	 mikäli	 hinta	 yli	 ajan	 on	 yhtä	 suuri	 kuin	 odotettavissa	 olevat	
korvaukset.	Tulos	voidaan	selittää	sillä,	että	riskiä	karttavat	viljelijät	mahdollisesti	käyt-
tävät	toiminnassaan	jo	muita	riskiä	vähentäviä	toimenpiteitä.	Tämä	osaltaan	pienentää	
satovakuutuksen	tarvetta	tilatasolla.		
Tutkimuksessa	löytyi	myös	viitteitä	haitallisen	valikoitumisen	ongelmasta	tulevassa	
satovakuutusjärjestelmässä.	 Tulokset	 osoittivat,	 että	 viljelijät	 jotka	 olivat	 saaneet	
korvauksia	satovahinkokorvaus	järjestelmästä,	olivat	myös	todennäköisempiä	ostamaan	
satovakuutuksen.	 Näin	 ollen	 vakuutusyhtiöiden	 on	 otettava	 haitallisen	 valikoitumisen	
ongelma	huomioon	vakuutuksia	hinnoiteltaessa.		
Tässä	 tutkimuksessa	 saadut	 tulokset	myös	 osoittivat,	 että	 EU:n	 tulisi	 harkita	 tuen	
sallimista	 laajemmalle	 joukolle	 riskienhallintavälineitä,	 sillä	 viljelijät	 preferoivat	 in-
deksivakuutuksia	 tilakohtaisiin	 vakuutuksiin	 verrattuna.	 Analyysi	 aluesatoihin	 perustu-
van	indeksivakuutuksen	tehokkuudesta	kuitenkin	osoitti,	että	niiden	tehokkuus	on	mata-
	8 
la	 Suomessa.	 Ainoastaan	 puolet	 viljelijöistä	 hyötyisi	 aluesatoihin	 perustuvasta	 in-
deksivakuutuksesta.	 Sääntöjä	 indeksivakuutusten	 tuelle	 tulisi	 alentaa	 EU:n	
lainsäädännössä,	 jotta	 aluesatoihin	 perustuvalle	 indeksivakuutuksia	 voisi	 tukea.	 Tämä	
avaisi	 vakuutusyhtiöille	mahdollisuuden	 kehittää	 innovatiivisia	 vakuutustuotteita,	 jotka	
perustuvat	esimerkiksi	kaukokartoituksen	tai	säädatan	hyödyntämiseen.		
	
Asiasanat:	satovakuutus,	valintakoemenetelmä,	katastrofiapu,	maksuhalukkuus,	mixed	
logit	malli,	stokastinen	simulointi,	indeksivakuutus,	hinta-ankkurointi	
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Crop	yields	are	dependent	on	stochastic	weather	events.	In	effect,	crop	insurance	mar-
kets	are	affected	by	unpredictable	weather	conditions.	Furthermore,	yield	risks	are	sys-
temic	and	 insurers	 face	asymmetric	 information	problems.	Thus,	public	 intervention	 is	
often	 a	 necessity	 for	 the	 development	 of	 private	 crop	 insurance	markets	 (Miranda	 &	
Glauber	1997,	Goodwin	2001).	The	ways	to	promote	crop	insurance	include	crop	insur-
ance	premium	subsidies	and	free	reinsurance.	However,	the	government	can	also	harm	
the	markets	if	the	boundaries	for	crop	insurance	and	disaster	relief	are	not	well	defined.	
Disaster	 relief	 is	 often	 granted	 after	 catastrophes.	 These	 ad-hoc	 payments	 serve	 the	
purpose	of	helping	farmers	to	rebuilt	their	lost	capital	when	available	insurance	do	not	
provide	enough	coverage	(Bardají	&	Garrido	2016).	
In	 Europe,	 crop	 and	 farm	 income	 insurance	markets	 are	 not	 well	 developed	 and	
governments	 and	 the	 EU	have	mostly	 relied	 on	 disaster	 relief	 payments	 and	 schemes	
fully	funded	by	taxpayers	in	agricultural	risk	management	(Bielza	Diaz-Caneja	et	al.	2009,	
Garrido	 &	 Bielza	 2008).	 However,	 the	 emphasis	 is	 moving	 from	 government-run	 pro-
grammes	 and	 disaster	 relief	 to	 insurances	 based	 on	 public–private	 partnership	 (PPP)	
(Meuwissen	et	al.	2013).	 In	PPP,	governments	subsidise	farmers	buying	yield	 insurance	
from	private	 insurance	companies.	Before	2015	member	states	had	the	opportunity	to	
finance	crop	insurance	premium	subsidies	from	national	budget	under	the	Article	68	of	
Pillar	one	Regulation	 (EC)	No	73/2009.	The	European	Union	 (EU)	 is	also	promoting	the	
use	 of	 PPP	 in	 the	 future	 Common	Agricultural	 Policy	 (CAP).	 The	 CAP	was	 reformed	 in	
2014,	and	 from	2015	onwards,	member	states	can	use	premium	subsidies	 for	crop	 in-
surances	based	on	PPP	as	part	of	rural	development.	The	maximum	subsidisation	 level	
for	crop	insurance	premiums	defined	in	the	Regulation	(EU)	No	1305/2013	is	65%.		
The	EU’s	crop	insurance	schemes	are	included	in	the	second	pillar	of	the	CAP.	This	
means	that	crop	insurances	are	co-financed	and	voluntary	for	member	states.	However,	
the	policies	 for	crop	damage	compensation	significantly	differ	among	the	countries	re-
garding	 government	 support	 and	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 schemes	 (Bielza	 Diaz-Caneja	 et	 al.	
2009,	Smith	&	Glauber	2013,	Bardají	&	Garrido,	2016).	In	the	period	2014–2020	total	of	
10	member	 states	 introduced	 crop	 insurance	 schemes	 under	 Rural	 Development	 pro-
grams.	The	projected	total	expenditure	of	these	schemes	is	2,213	million	Euros.	In	mon-
etary	terms	Italy	has	the	biggest	crop	insurance	scheme	(1,397	million	Euros)	under	Ru-
ral	 development	 Program	 followed	 by	 France	 (541	million	 Euros),	 Hungary	 (76	milloin	
Euros)	and	the	Netherlands	(54	million	Euros)	(Bardají	&	Garrido	2016).	However,	the	EU	
contribution	to	crop	insurance	schemes	in	total	is	less	than	2%	of	pillar	two	expenditure	
and	less	than	0.5%	of	the	total	2014–2020	CAP	budget.		
The	other	option	for	the	EU	would	have	been	to	include	crop	insurance	in	the	first	
pillar	of	the	CAP	and	 introduce	an	EU-wide	common	crop	 insurance	policy.	This	option	
would	have	forced	EU	member	states	to	adopt	the	programme.	As	already	mentioned,	
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the	 EU	 did	 not	 introduce	 an	 EU-wide	 common	 crop	 insurance	 policy.	 This	 decision	 is	
completely	different	from	the	policy	adopted,	for	example,	in	the	US	and	Canada,	where	
support	for	risk	management	schemes	forms	a	significant	share	of	agricultural	subsidies.	
In	addition,	the	EU	decided	to	follow	the	regulations	set	by	the	World	Trade	Organisa-
tion	(WTO)	on	support	for	crop	insurance,	which	is	not	the	case,	for	example,	in	the	US	
(WTO	1994,	Sproul	et	al.	2013).		
Finland	 is	 at	 the	northern	end	of	 Europe,	where	 the	harsh	 climate	and	high	 yield	
variability	 increases	 the	 yield	 risks	 of	 farming.	 Variable	weather	 events	 are	 familiar	 to	
producers,	 and	 Finnish	 farmers	 are	 highly	 skilled	 in	 preventing	 crop	 losses	 using	
measures	at	the	farm	level.	These	measures	and	knowledge	are	transferred	from	gener-
ation	to	generation,	as	Finnish	farms	have	almost	all	remained	under	ownership	by	the	
same	families	over	time.	Despite	the	fact	that	agriculture	has	many	positive	social	and	
environmental	effects	on	society,	agriculture’s	share	of	total	GDP	in	2012	was	only	1.2%.	
However,	due	 to	 the	geographical	 location	of	Finland	and	agriculture’s	multifunctional	
role	 in	 the	 country,	 considerable	 support	 is	 provided	 to	 obtain	 self-sufficiency	 in	 food	
production.	Thus,	the	agricultural	payments	from	the	EU	are	topped	up	with	a	variety	of	
national	subsidies	to	promote	farmers’	incomes	and	maintain	production	levels.	In	2014,	
national	subsidies	formed	some	27%	of	the	total	share	of	support	for	agriculture	in	Fin-
land.	 Subsidies	 for	 agriculture	 form	 a	major	 share	 of	 farm	 income,	 especially	 on	 crop	
farms	in	Finland.		
Finnish	 farms	 are	 small	 compared	 to	 the	 average	 size	 of	 farms,	 for	 example,	 in	
Sweden,	 Denmark	 and	 Germany.	 The	 structural	 development	 of	 farms	 in	 Finland	 has	
been	 rapid,	but	 the	 farm	structure	 is	 still	 lagging	behind	 its	 counterparts	 in	 the	EU.	 In	
Finland,	crop	production	forms	only	a	small	share	of	the	total	value	of	agricultural	pro-
duction.	 In	2011,	only	15.6%	of	 the	total	market	value	of	agricultural	production	came	
from	cereal	crop	production	(Statistics	Finland	2015).	However,	 the	majority	of	Finnish	
farms	 (60.2%	 in	 2014)	 are	 crop	 production	 farms	 (Table	 1).	 This	 implies	 that	 other	
sources	of	income	are	important	for	a	large	proportion	of	Finnish	farms.	About	one-third	
of	Finnish	farms	was	diversified	 in	2013,	 i.e.	had	other	entrepreneurship	 in	addition	to	
agriculture	(Luke	2015).	For	example,	forestry	is	also	an	important	source	of	income	for	
a	large	proportion	of	farms.	The	above-mentioned	factors	may	reduce	the	need	for	yield	
risk	management	 at	 the	 farm	 level,	 as	 they	 reduce	 the	 significance	 of	 crop	 output	 in	
farm	income	formation.	
Crop	production	 is	 concentrated	 in	 southern	and	western	parts	of	 Finland,	where	
the	climate	and	parcel	structure	 is	the	most	suitable	for	arable	farming.	The	total	area	
under	crop	production	was	some	1.1	million	hectares	in	2014.	The	total	crop	production	
was	some	4.13	million	tons.	28%	of	the	total	producrion	was	suitable	for	milling.	Thus,	a	
major	 share	 of	 the	 crop	 output	 is	 used	 as	 feed.	Main	 feed	 crops	 are	 barley	 and	 oats.	
Barley	is	also	the	main	crop	cultivated	in	Finland	(some	44.5%	of	the	area	under	cereal	
crops	 in	2014),	 followed	by	oats	and	wheat	 (respectively	27.3%	and	23.9%	of	 the	area	
under	 cereal	 crops).	 In	 addition	 to	 cereals,	 for	 example	 potatoes	 are	 grown	 in	 many	
parts	of	the	country.		
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Table	1.	Statistics	for	crop	production	in	Finland	in	2013	to	2014	(Luke	2015).	
	 2013	 2014	
Number	of	crop	and	other	plant	production	farms	 32,300	 31,769	
%	of	all	farms	 59.4%	 60.2%	
Cultivated	hectares	per	farm	on	average	 41.5	 43.0	
Area	under	crop	production	(1,000	ha)	 1,117	 1,100	
Total	crop	production	(million	kg)	 4,063	 4,128	
from	which	suitable	for	milling	(%)	 22.0%	 28.2%	
	
Until	2016,	the	Finnish	government	relied	on	an	old-fashioned	policy	for	crop	dam-
age	 compensation.	 The	 publicly	 funded	 and	 administered	 crop	 damage	 compensation	
(CDC)	system	was	designed	to	cover	yield	losses	in	Finland.	The	CDC	scheme	was	started	
in	1976	and	covered	all	the	major	field	crops.	However,	some	high-value	crops,	such	as	
strawberries,	were	not	 included.	The	compensation	was	restricted	to	an	annual	aggre-
gate	budget	constraint	of	3.4	million	Euros.	Farmers	could	collect	CDC	payments	 if	 the	
overall	output	of	all	crops	on	their	farm	fell	below	70%	of	the	area	reference	yield.	Thus,	
even	if	farmers	experienced	total	loss	on	a	specific	field,	they	were	not	eligible	for	com-
pensation	if	the	losses	for	the	entire	farm	did	not	exceed	the	30%	deductible.	When	the	
farmer	 applied	 for	 compensation,	 crop	 losses	 were	 inspected	 at	 the	 farm	 level.	 The	
monetary	compensation	was	a	product	of	the	quantity	 lost,	net	of	the	deductible,	and	
the	average	producer	price.	The	losses	had	to	be	verified	on	the	farm	before	the	harvest	
and	quality	losses	were	not	compensated.	
The	 CDC	 system	 suffered	 from	 major	 moral	 hazard	 problems	 (Myyrä	 &	 Pietola	
2011,	Myyrä	&	 Jauhiainen	2012).	Furthermore,	because	compensation	payments	were	
based	on	regional	average	yields,	farmers	operating	at	high	yield	levels	received	relative-
ly	less	if	they	suffered	a	substantial	loss.		As	a	result	of	European	Commission	objection	
and	obvious	deficiencies	 in	 the	CDC	 system,	 the	programme	was	abolished	 in	2015.	A	
new	risk	management	tool	built	on	public–private	partnership	(PPP)	covering	crop	dam-
age	losses	in	Finland	was	considered	from	2016	onwards.	The	new	policy	was	expected	
to	rely	on	crop	insurances.	From	2015	onwards,	the	government	and	the	EU	can	cover	
65%	 of	 the	 insurance	 premium	 according	 to	 the	 European	 Council	 and	 Parliament	
agreement	on	the	future	of	the	CAP.	Moreover,	the	deductible	cannot	be	less	than	30%	
(European	 Commission	 2013).	 These	 guidelines	 follow	 the	World	 Trade	Organisation’s	
(WTO)	agreement	on	non-production	distortive	support	for	crop	insurance	(WTO	1994).	
However,	 the	 Finnish	 government	 chose	 not	 to	 introduce	 premium	 subsidies	 for	 crop	
insurance.	The	aim	was	to	give	room	for	completely	private	solutions	just	after	the	aboli-
tion	of	the	CDC	scheme	(Ministry	of	Agriculture	and	Forestry	2014).	Another	major	rea-
son	for	not	implementing	premium	subsidies	was	the	tax	related	to	insurance	products.	
Crop	 insurance	products	are	subject	to	24%	value	added	tax	(VAT)	 in	Finland.	This	was	
seen	as	a	problem	for	the	government,	as	it	would	subsidise	a	product	that	is	then	taxed	
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after	 the	 subsidy.	 In	 addition	 the	VAT	 raises	 the	 price	 of	 insurance	 to	 the	 farmer	 and	
higher	price	 leads	 to	 lower	demand.	Naturally,	private	 insurance	companies	and	 farm-
ers’	organisations	are	in	favour	of	abolishing	the	tax	on	crop	insurance	products.		
There	 is	 a	 vast	 body	of	 literature	 on	 crop	 insurance,	 and	 this	 thesis	 has	 naturally	
been	built	on	this	previous	knowledge.	The	main	body	of	 literature	has	 focused	on	re-
vealing	 factors	 affecting	 the	 decision	 to	 purchase	 crop	 insurance	 among	 farmers.	 The	
challenge	has	been	in	forecasting	and	explaining	insurance	purchase	decisions.	Adverse	
selection	 is	 a	 problem	 from	 the	 insurers’	 point	 of	 view.	 The	 systemic	 effects	 between	
insurance	and	investments	(moral	hazard)	have	also	attracted	considerable	interest.	This	
is	because	insurance	may	reduce	investments	in	measures	that	reduce	yield	variability,	
such	as	drainage	systems	or	liming.	Moral	hazard	is	not	only	a	problem	from	the	insur-
ers’	 point	 of	 view.	 The	 resilience	 of	 farmers	 to	 yield	 risks	 should	 be	 strengthened,	 as	
climate	change	will	pose	greater	uncertainty	in	the	future	(IPCC	2013).		
The	government	can	also	hinder	the	viability	of	crop	insurance	products.	It	is	often	
observed	that	once	the	worst-case	scenario	is	realised	and	large-scale	yield	losses	occur	
through	catastrophic	events,	 there	 is	 social	pressure	 to	help	 farmers	 in	distress.	These	
government	actions	distort	the	development	of	crop	insurance	markets	(Asseldonk	et	al.	
2002,	Asseldonk	et	al.	2013).	If	the	government	covers	crop	losses,	the	market	niche	for	
crop	insurance	may	be	too	small.	Thus,	there	is	a	call	for	clear	boundaries	for	risk	man-
agement	in	agriculture	(OECD	2011).			
The	aim	of	 this	 thesis	 study	was	 to	provide	empirical	 information	on	 the	demand	
for	 crop	 insurance	and	 factors	 affecting	 the	decision	of	 farmers	 to	 insure	against	 crop	
losses	to	enable	the	development	of	crop	insurance	markets	 in	Finland.	This	study	was	
based	on	the	choice	experiment	(CE)	approach	to	model	the	demand	and	farmers’	pref-
erences	 for	 crop	 insurance	 attributes,	 because	 crop	 insurance	markets	 do	not	 exist	 in	
Finland.	This	approach	has	not	been	extensively	used	in	previous	research,	and	it	is	also	
one	of	the	novel	aspects	of	this	thesis.	In	addition,	this	study	revealed	the	heterogeneity	
among	 farmers	 in	 their	 willingness	 to	 pay	 (WTP)	 for	 crop	 insurance,	 their	 choice	 to	
adopt	crop	insurance	products	and	their	attitudes	towards	risk.		
In	 the	next	section,	 the	theory	of	crop	 insurance	and	the	 literature	on	crop	 insur-
ance	demand	are	introduced.	After	that,	the	objectives	of	this	thesis	are	introduced.	In	
the	 second	 section,	 the	 datasets	 and	 research	methods	 used	 in	 this	 thesis	 are	 briefly	
introduced.	 The	 third	 section	 summarises	 and	 discusses	 the	 research	 findings	 of	 this	
thesis	and	the	final	section	concludes.	The	four	articles	forming	this	thesis	are	presented	
in	the	appendix.		
1.2. Crop insurance as a risk management tool 
In	this	section,	the	theory	underpinning	the	demand	for	crop	insurance	is	introduced.	In	
addition,	 problems	 related	 to	 crop	 insurance	 are	 considered,	 the	 overall	 situation	 of	
crop	insurance	in	developed	countries	is	briefly	discussed,	and	factors	affecting	farmers’	
demand	for	crop	insurance	are	considered.	
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1.2.1. The theory of crop insurance 
The	theory	of	insurance	is	based	on	expected	utility	theory	introduced	by	von	Neumann	
and	 Morgenstern	 (1944).	 Expected	 utility	 theory	 also	 forms	 the	 basis	 for	 theoretical	
considerations	 of	 the	 demand	 for	 crop	 insurance	 (Goodwin	&	 Smith	 1995).	 In	 the	 ex-
pected	utility	theory,	perfect	information	is	assumed.	Thus,	the	probabilities	of	alterna-
tive	outcomes	are	assumed	to	be	known	with	certainty.	The	neoclassical	theory	of	pro-
ducer	choice	under	uncertainty	assumes	that	agents	are	averse	to	risk.	In	the	crop	insur-
ance	framework,	this	suggests	that	farmers	are	always	willing	to	pay	to	lower	the	risk	if	
the	expected	returns	are	held	constant	(Goodwin	&	Smith	1995).	This	is	due	to	decreas-
ing	marginal	utility	i.e.	the	utility	function	of	the	agent	is	concave.	
Usually,	the	optimal	insurance	is	considered	under	the	von	Neumann-Morgenstern	
utility	 framework.	Consider	 a	 crop	 insurance	 contract	 that	will	 collect	 a	premium	of	α	
and	will	pay	the	farmer	indemnity	(L)	when	a	loss	occurs,	and	the	probability	of	crop	loss	
is	π.	When	the	insurer	is	risk	neutral,	the	costs	for	providing	the	crop	insurance	are	zero,	
the	crop	insurance	market	 is	competitive,	and	the	crop	insurance	contract	satisfies	α	=	
πL.	In	an	insurance	market,	α	is	also	referred	to	as	a	fair	premium.		
	
	
Figure	1.	Optimal	insurance	purchases	in	a	competitive	market	(Goodwin	&	Smith	1995).	
	
The	equilibrium	of	 insurance	purchases	 is	 illustrated	 in	Figure	1.	Agents	start	with	
an	 initial	 endowment	 e.	 In	 e,	 their	 wealth	 is	 equal	 to	W	without	 a	 loss,	 which	 corre-
sponds	to	state	1.	Their	wealth	is	W	–	L	when	loss	occurs	(state	2).	Exposure	to	risk	can	
be	reduced	by	trading	along	the	fair	odds	line	(1	–	π)/π,	where	π	 is	the	probability	of	a	
loss.	 If	agents	are	risk	averse,	they	will	trade	to	the	point	A.	 In	this	point,	the	fair	odds	
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line	intersects	the	45o	line.	In	case	of	a	loss	(at	state	2),	agents	will	derive	utility	W	–	α,	
which	is	exactly	the	same	as	if	no	loss	occurs.	Under	the	expected	utility	framework	with	
actually	fair	crop	insurance	premiums,	the	farmer	will	always	fully	insure	(Goodwin	and	
Smith,	 1995).	However,	 in	 crop	 insurance	markets,	 insurers	 face	problems	 that	hinder	
the	development	of	these	markets.	These	issues	are	considered	next.	
1.2.2. Problems in crop insurance 
Governments	 are	 often	 involved	 in	 crop	 insurance	markets.	 An	 explanation	 for	 this	 is	
market	failure,	i.e.	private	markets	are	not	efficient	enough	in	supplying	crop	insurance.	
For	a	general	 case,	we	can	 identify	 two	major	 issues	 that	 call	 for	government	 involve-
ment:	 asymmetric	 information	 and	 systemic	 risks	 (Goodwin	 2001).	 However	 in	 many	
cases	market	 failure	 is	 used	 as	 an	 argument	 to	 justify	 government	 intervention.	 Thus	
crop	insurance	is	also	used	as	an	income	subsidy	(Goodwin	2001).	However	this	mainly	
refers	to	the	US	case	and	does	not	necessarily	apply,	for	example,	 in	the	EU	and	espe-
cially	not	in	Finland.	
As	 already	 mentioned,	 the	 expected	 utility	 theory	 assumes	 perfect	 information.	
However,	 this	assumption	 is	often	violated	 in	crop	 insurance	markets,	 implying	 imper-
fect	 information	 between	 the	 insurer	 and	 the	 farmer.	 Imperfect	 information	 leads	 to	
adverse	selection	and	moral	hazard	problems	in	crop	insurance	markets.		
Adverse	 selection	may	 occur	 if	 farmers	 have	more	 information	 about	 their	 likeli-
hood	of	crop	loss	than	insurers.	Thus,	insurers	are	unable	to	detect	high-risk	farmers	and	
collect	higher	premiums	from	this	group.	 In	effect,	high-risk	 farmers	are	undercharged	
and	 low-risk	 farmers	 are	 overcharged.	 Furthermore,	 high-risk	 farmers	 end	 up	 over-
purchasing	crop	insurance,	whereas	low	risk	farmers	under-purchase	insurance.	Because	
the	insurer	is	unable	to	discriminate	farmers	according	to	their	probability	of	crop	loss,	
the	insurance	pool	becomes	heterogeneous.	Increasing	the	crop	insurance	premium	will	
not	correct	the	situation,	because	 in	this	case	 low-risk	farmers	will	 lower	their	crop	 in-
surance	purchase	at	a	faster	rate	than	will	the	high-risk	farmers.	In	the	worst	case	driv-
ing	up	premiums	due	to	adverse	selection	will	result	in	insurance	markets	disappearing.		
The	situation	where	adverse	selection	occurs	is	presented	in	Figure	2.	The	low-risk	
agent	has	a	 steeper	 fair	odds	 line	 (line	 (1-πL/	πL)	 in	Figure	2)	 than	 the	high-risk	agent	
(line	(1-πH/	πH)	 in	Figure	2).	This	is	because	the	low-risk	agent	has	lower	probability	of	
loss	than	the	high-risk	agent.	 If	the	insurer	 is	able	to	discriminate	between	the	groups,	
actuarially	fair	rates	are	charged.	Agents	are	then	charged	according	to	their	probability	
of	 loss	(points	A	and	B)	and	the	outcome	is	competitive.	Competitiveness	refers	to	the	
market	equilibrium,	where	agent’s	utility	cannot	be	increased	without	decreasing	other	
agents’	utility.	Thus	this	outcome	also	maximises	social	welfare.	 If	discrimination	is	not	
possible,	 the	 actuarially	 fair	 rate	will	 lie	 somewhere	between	 the	 loss	 probabilities.	 In	
effect,	the	outcome	is	not	competitive,	as	low-risk	agents	under-purchase	(point	A’)	and	
high-risk	agents	will	over-purchase	(point	B’)	the	insurance.		
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Figure	2.	Insurance	purchase	with	adverse	selection	(Goodwin	&	Smith	1995).		
	
There	 is	 empirical	 evidence	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 crop	 insurance	markets	 are	 ex-
posed	to	adverse	selection	problems.	For	example,	Goodwin	(1993)	found	that	produc-
ers	 with	 differing	 levels	 of	 loss	 risk	 have	 different	 demand	 elasticities.	 According	 to	
Smith	 and	Baquet	 (1996),	 farmers	with	positive	 expected	 returns	 from	crop	 insurance	
make	 coverage-level	 decisions	 in	 a	 different	 manner	 from	 farmers	 with	 negative	 ex-
pected	returns.	Just	et	al.	(1999)	noted	that	one	reason	for	US	producers	to	participate	
in	 crop	 insurance	was	 adverse	 selection	 incentives.	 Furthermore,	Makki	 and	 Somwaru	
(2001)	observed	that	high-risk	farmers	are	more	 likely	to	select	higher	coverage	levels.	
They	also	found	that	low-risk	farmers	were	overcharged	in	US	crop	insurance	markets.		
In	 the	 moral	 hazard	 problem,	 the	 probability	 of	 crop	 loss	 becomes	 endogenised	
(Goodwin	&	Smith	1995).	Under	this	problem,	the	insurer	is	unable	to	monitor	the	pro-
tection	efforts	of	 farmers.	 In	effect,	 farmers	who	purchase	crop	 insurance	do	not	 take	
measures	 that	 protect	 against	 crop	 losses.	 There	 is	 evidence	 that	 farmers	 alter	 their	
behaviour	after	purchasing	crop	insurance.	Mishra	et	al.	(2005)	found	that	wheat	farm-
ers	who	had	purchased	revenue	insurance	spent	less	on	fertilizers.	In	their	seminal	arti-
cle,	Smith	and	Goodwin	(1996)	reported	that	insured	farmers	tend	to	use	a	lower	chem-
ical	input.	The	rationale	behind	these	observations	is	that	a	smaller	input	use	with	crop	
insurance	is	expected	to	lead	to	a	higher	risk	of	crop	damage.		
In	order	for	the	insurer	to	be	able	to	reduce	the	effects	of	asymmetric	information	
in	 crop	 insurance	 contracts,	 different	 farmer	groups	 should	be	detected	and	 the	price	
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set	 according	 their	 risk	profile.	However,	 as	 Esuola	et	 al.	 (2007)	point	out,	 eliminating	
the	moral	hazard	or	adverse	selection	problem	is	costly.	Deductible	 levels	are	one	way	
to	eliminate	moral	hazard	problems.	Also	cost	sharing	is	used	as	means	to	reduce	prob-
lems	arising	from	asymmetric	 information	(Gramig	et	al.	2009).	Another	approach	is	to	
use	 index	 insurances.	 In	 index	 insurances,	payments	are	based	on	some	predefined	 in-
dex,	such	as	the	area	yield	or	rainfall	measured	at	certain	point.	With	 index	 insurance,	
the	insurance	markets	still	face	two	problems:	basis	risk	and	systemic	risks.	Basis	risk	is	
the	potential	mismatch	between	the	insurance	payout	and	actual	crop	losses	at	the	farm	
level.	Basis	 risk	 is	problem	 for	 the	 insured	 farmer.	 If	 the	correlation	of	 individual	 farm	
yields	and	the	index	is	low,	farms	may	suffer	crop	loss	but	not	collect	any	payments.	Of	
course	the	opposite	is	also	possible,	and	farms	could	collect	payments	without	suffering	
any	losses.		
Most	weather	events	are	systemic	and	crop	losses	are	realised	in	many	locations	at	
the	same	time.	Thus,	crop	insurance	markets	face	systemic	risks	due	to	the	positive	cor-
relation	between	crop	yields.	When	crop	risks	are	highly	correlated,	risk	pooling	of	yields	
is	not	possible,	creating	major	downside	risks	for	the	insurer	(Miranda	1991,	Miranda	&	
Glauber	 1997).	 The	 systemic	 nature	 of	 crop	 yields	 calls	 for	 subsidised	 reinsurance	 for	
insurance	 companies	 providing	 yield	 insurance	 (whether	 index-	 or	 farm-based	 insur-
ance).	Basis	risk	and	systemic	risks	are	considered	in	article	II	of	this	thesis.		
1.2.3. Crop insurance in developed countries 
The	availability	of	crop	insurance	products	in	a	country	is	a	function	of	government	sub-
sidies	 for	 crop	 insurance,	 a	 viable	 infrastructure	 for	 crop	 insurance	 supply	 and	 the	 in-
formation	and	data	to	support	the	underwriting	and	actuarial	analysis	that	ensures	crop	
insurances	 are	 viable	 products	 (Smith	 &	 Glauber	 2012).	 Basically,	 risk	 management	
schemes	 and	 disaster	 relief	 are	 often	 used	 as	 income	 support	 for	 farmers	 (Goodwin	
2001,	Goodwin	&	Rejesus	2008).	However,	the	situation	concerning	crop	insurance	dif-
fers	significantly	between	developed	countries.	In	the	US	and	Canada,	risk	management	
schemes	are	extensive	and	heavily	subsidised.	In	the	EU,	member	countries	have	mainly	
relied	on	 ad	hoc	 government	disaster	 relief,	 and	 risk	management	 tools	 have	 concen-
trated	on	covering	some	named	peril,	such	as	frost	or	hail	(Smith	&	Glauber	2012).		
The	most	 extensive	 risk	management	 policies	 exist	 in	 the	US	 and	 Canada,	where	
multiple	risk	management	schemes	are	available	for	crop	producers	(Smith	and	Glauber,	
2012).	 In	the	EU,	five	member	countries	(Germany,	Greece,	Hungary,	Finland	and	Swe-
den)	have	unsubsidised	crop	insurances	(Smith	&	Glauber	2012).	 In	2014	altogether	13	
member	countries	subsidised	crop	insurances	through	state	aids.	Three	of	these	(France,	
Italy	and	The	Netherlands)	use	also	second	pillar	support	 for	crop	 insurance	(Bardají	&	
Garrido	2016).		
Among	the	EU	countries,	the	most	extensive	crop	insurance	scheme	exists	in	Spain.	
The	Spanish	crop	insurance	system	is	based	on	public–private	partnership,	where	differ-
ent	 insurance	 schemes	 are	 provided	 by	 the	 private	 insurance	 company	 Agroseguro.	
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Farmers	are	eligible	for	premium	subsidies,	and	premiums	collected	by	Agroseguro	are	
controlled	 by	 the	 government	 agency	 (OECD	 2011).	 The	 Spanish	 example	 shows	 that	
crop	insurance	policies	may	need	government	support	on	many	levels	in	order	for	them	
to	become	widely	adopted.	However,	German	example	shows	that	private	market	crop	
insurance	products	can	be	viable	if	only	named	perils	are	insured.	In	Germany	farmers'	
mutuals	have	provided	hail	insurance	for	over	100	years.		
In	 general,	 the	 broader	 picture	 of	 crop	 insurance	 supply	 in	 the	 EU	 is	 that	 larger	
member	 countries	 in	 the	 southern	EU,	namely	 France,	 Spain	and	 Italy,	 rely	on	public–
private	 partnership	 (PPP)	 and	 multi-peril	 crop	 insurance	 products,	 whereas	 member	
states	in	the	northern	EU	rely	on	private	solutions	and	crop	insurances	are	provided	for	
named	perils	 (Bielza	Diaz-Caneja	et	al.	2009,	Bardají	&	Garrido,	2016).	 In	PPP,	the	gov-
ernment	subsidises	crop	 insurance	premiums.	Thus,	 it	appears	 that	multi-peril	crop	 in-
surances	are	seen	as	too	risky	for	the	insurers	without	premium	subsidies.	Named	peril	
insurances	are	more	appealing	for	insurers,	as	many	named	perils,	such	as	hail	or	frost,	
are	generally	stochastic	events.	In	the	southern	part	of	the	EU,	more	systemic	risks,	such	
as	drought,	are	experienced,	which	may	explain	the	widespread	use	of	government	sup-
port	in	crop	insurance.				
The	Finnish	government	did	not	introduce	a	crop	insurance	premium	subsidy	in	the	
2014	CAP	reform.	In	2015,	two	major	agricultural	 insurers	announced	that	they	will	 in-
troduce	a	crop	insurance	product	in	2016	(MT	2015).	The	remaining	issue	is	the	VAT	for	
insurances,	which	is	seen	as	a	problem	from	the	insurance	companies’	point	of	view.	If	
the	government	 introduces	premium	subsidies	for	crop	 insurance,	the	status	of	VAT	 in	
crop	insurance	needs	to	be	resolved.		
In	addition	to	VAT,	crop	insurance	premiums	include	transaction	costs	that	increase	
the	price	of	insurance.	Naturally	insurers	need	to	cover	administrative	costs.	Administra-
tive	costs	tend	to	be	higher	 if	 information	systems	are	put	 in	place	due	to	asymmetric	
information.	In	addition	insurers	add	reserve	load	to	insurance	premiums.	Reserve	load	
is	added	because	of	 the	variance	around	expected	 losses.	These	 financial	 reserves	can	
be	used	in	years	when	indemnity	payments	exceed	collected	premius.	If	loss	events	are	
highly	correlated	between	insured	individuals,	as	it	is	the	case	with	crop	yields,	insurers	
also	add	catastrophic	 load	to	premium	rates.	 Investors	also	 tend	to	demand	return	on	
equity	(Skees	&	Barnett	1999).	Thus	actuarially	fair	premium	rates	do	not	exist	without	
premium	subsidies.			
1.2.4. Factors affecting the demand for crop insurance 
For	the	development	of	crop	insurance	markets,	knowledge	of	the	factors	affecting	the	
demand	for	crop	insurance	is	essential.	In	this	thesis,	the	factors	affecting	crop	insurance	
demand	 are	 considered	 in	 articles	 I,	 III	 and	 IV.	 The	 factors	 explaining	 the	 decision	 of	
farmers	to	 insure	against	crop	 losses	have	been	extensively	 investigated	 in	the	agricul-
tural	economics	literature.	Previous	studies	have	also	revealed	that	farmer	behaviour	is	
not	only	influenced	by	their	strategies	and	attitudes,	but	also	by	exogenous	actions.	For	
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example,	 the	availability	of	government	disaster	 relief	may	hinder	 the	development	of	
crop	insurance	markets	(van	Asseldonk	et	al.	2002,	van	Asseldonk	et	al.	2013).	 In	addi-
tion,	the	development	is	affected	by	uncertainty	about	the	long-term	availability	of	gov-
ernment	support	(Meuwissen	et	al.	2013).	Farmers	may	not	be	aware	of	the	true	level	of	
the	risk	they	are	facing	(Ogurtsov	et	al.	2009),	and	in	some	countries,	such	as	in	Finland,	
the	 lack	of	previous	experience	of	 crop	 insurance	products	may	slow	down	 the	devel-
opment	of	the	market.		
Previous	 studies	 on	 crop	 insurance	 demand	 have	 identified	 multiple	 farm	 and	
farmer	characteristics	explaining	the	choice	to	insure	against	crop	losses.	For	example,	in	
the	 US,	 farm	 size	 (acreage)	 has	 been	 found	 to	 have	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 this	 demand	
(Goodwin	1993,	Coble	et	al.	1996,	Sherrick	et	al.	2003,	Sherrick	et	al.	2004,	Ginder	et	al.	
2009).	 In	 addition,	 for	 example,	 Sherrick	 et	 al.	 (2003)	 observed	 that	 younger	 farmers	
were	more	willing	to	purchase	crop	insurance.	Smith	and	Baquet	(1996)	and	Mishra	and	
Goodwin	(2003)	observed	that	the	demand	for	crop	insurance	was	greater	among	edu-
cated	 farmers.	Previous	studies	have	also	determined	 that	 the	demand	 for	crop	 insur-
ance	is	greater	on	farms	with	a	high	debt-to-asset	ratio	(Smith	&	Goodwin	1996,	Mishra	
&	Goodwin	2003).		
In	 Europe,	 the	 determinants	 of	 crop	 insurance	 demand	 have	 been	 examined,	 for	
example,	in	Spain,	the	Netherlands	and	France.	Garrido	and	Zilberman	(2008)	observed	
that	 premium	 subsidies	were	 the	 leading	 factor	 in	 explaining	 farmers’	 participation	 in	
crop	 insurance	 schemes	 in	 Spain.	 Enjolras	 and	 Sentis	 (2011)	 investigated	 the	 factors	
affecting	 the	 choice	 to	 insure	 against	 crop	 losses	 among	 French	 farmers.	 They	 found	
that	 the	 likelihood	 of	 insuring	 was	 greater	 among	 those	 farmers	 who	 had	 previously	
experienced	a	hazard,	or	were	more	diversified	and	specialized	than	on	average.	In	addi-
tion,	 farm	size	positively	affected	the	decision	to	 insure	against	crop	 losses.	Van	Assel-
donk	et	al.	 (2002)	 investigated	crop	 insurance	choice	among	Dutch	farmers	with	ques-
tionnaire	 data.	 They	 observed	 that	 farmer	 age	 had	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	 choice	 of	
insurance,	but	the	demand	was	lower	among	arable	farmers	and	greenhouse	producers.	
In	addition,	farmers’	beliefs	in	the	government	providing	disaster	relief	in	the	future	had	
a	negative	effect	on	the	demand.	Ogurtsov	et	al.	(2009)	studied	the	decision	to	purchase	
catastrophe	 insurance	 among	 Dutch	 dairy	 and	 arable	 farmers	 with	 actual	 insurance	
choice	data.	They	found	that	the	age	of	the	farmer	and	off-farm	income	negatively	af-
fected	the	decision	to	purchase	insurance	against	crop	losses.		
Agriculture	is	a	risky	business.	Farmers	are	well	aware	of	this	and	take	risks	into	ac-
count	 in	production	decisions.	However,	not	all	 farmers	are	alike	 in	 terms	of	 their	 risk	
profile	and	appetite	 for	 risk	 taking.	Production	 risk	and	 farmers’	 risk	preferences	have	
been	 considered	as	 the	main	 factors	underlying	 farm	management	 and	 land	use	deci-
sions	(Chavas	et	al.	2010).	Producers’	risk	preferences	also	affect	the	decision	to	insure	
against	crop	losses	(Goodwin	1993).	As	mentioned	in	the	section	on	crop	insurance	the-
ory,	assumptions	concerning	risk	preferences	and	crop	insurance	decisions	are	based	on	
the	expected	utility	theory	framework.	Expected	utility	theory	indicates	that	if	the	price	
of	 insurance	 is	 fair,	 a	 risk-averse	 decision	maker	 will	 always	 be	 willing	 to	 insure.	 The	
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effect	of	 farmers’	 risk	preferences	on	 the	decision	 to	 insure	against	 crop	 losses	 in	Fin-
land	are	considered	in	article	IV	of	this	thesis.		
The	literature	on	crop	insurance	demand	does	not	fully	support	the	implications	of	
risk	aversion	for	crop	insurance.	Just	et	al.	(1999)	found	that	the	risk	aversion	incentive	
has	 a	 small	 role	 in	 the	 decision	 of	 farmers	 to	 purchase	 crop	 insurance	 in	 the	US,	 and	
producers	mainly	participate	in	crop	insurance	programmes	because	of	the	subsidy	and	
for	adverse	selection	reasons.	Babcock	(2015)	showed	that	cumulative	prospect	theory	
is	more	suitable	in	estimating	farmers’	crop	insurance	coverage	levels	than	the	expected	
utility	framework.	The	key	point	is	that	decision	maker’s	loss	aversion	level	reduces	the	
attractiveness	of	crop	insurance,	because	farmer	suffers	a	loss	when	the	insurance	does	
not	pay	off.	 	Conversely,	 results	have	also	been	presented	 that	 support	 the	claim	that	
risk-averse	farmers	are	more	willing	to	insure.	Smith	and	Goodwin	(1996)	reported	that	
risk	aversion	 in	producers	has	a	positive	effect	on	the	decision	to	purchase	crop	 insur-
ance	in	the	US,	while	Ogurtsov	et	al.	(2009)	observed	that	the	attitude	towards	risk	was	
significant	in	the	decision	to	purchase	catastrophe	insurance	by	Dutch	arable	farmers.	
1.3. Objectives 
The	overall	aim	of	this	thesis	study	was	to	provide	empirical	 information	for	the	devel-
opment	of	crop	insurance	markets	in	Finland.	More	specifically,	the	objectives	were	to:			
	
1)	 study	 farmers’	preferences	and	willingness	 to	pay	 (WTP)	 for	 crop	 insurance	at-
tributes,		
	
2)	reveal	the	effects	of	the	price	anchoring	problem	in	crop	insurance,		
	
3)	provide	guidelines	for	government	disaster	relief	in	combination	with	crop	insur-
ances,		
	
4)	investigate	the	factors	underlying	crop	insurance	uptake	and		
	
5)	assess	the	feasibility	of	index	crop	insurance	based	on	area	yields	in	Finland.	
	
Objective	1	was	considered	in	articles	I	and	III,	in	which	the	demand	for	crop	insur-
ance	and	 farmers	WTP	was	measured.	Objective	2	was	 addressed	 in	 article	 I	with	 the	
split	 data	approach.	Objective	4	was	 studied	 in	 article	 III,	 in	which	 the	 role	of	 govern-
ments	in	crop	insurance	markets	was	considered.		Objective	4	was	addressed	in	articles	
I,	III	and	IV,	and	objective	5	was	examined	in	article	II.		
In	 article	 I,	 farmers’	WTP	 for	 crop	 insurance	 policies	 in	 Finland	was	 examined.	 In	
addition,	the	effect	of	varying	price	levels	on	the	WTP	was	considered	in	the	choice	ex-
periment	(CE)	context.	CE	is	a	discrete	choice	model,	where	respondents	are	presented	
multiple	choices	with	varying	attribute	levels.	The	models	in	article	I	also	included	farm	
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and	farmer	characteristics,	such	as	the	age	of	the	farmer	and	number	of	cultivated	hec-
tares,	which	provided	insights	into	which	farmers	were	more	likely	to	choose	crop	insur-
ance.	However,	these	issues	were	more	closely	considered	in	articles	III	and	IV.		
The	aim	of	article	 II	was	to	examine	whether	area	yield	 insurance	is	a	feasible	op-
tion	for	Finnish	agriculture,	given	the	restrictions	imposed	by	EU	rural	development	leg-
islation	 (European	 Commission	 2013).	 More	 specifically,	 we	 analysed	 the	 extent	 to	
which	two	drawbacks	of	area	yield	insurance,	basis	and	systemic	risk,	would	be	present	
if	 it	 was	 introduced	 to	 Finnish	 farmers.	 Article	 III	 addressed	 the	 issue	 of	 government	
disaster	relief	and	examined	its	effect	on	farmers’	WTP	for	crop	insurance.		
This	dissertation	 is	 the	 first	comprehensive	study	 to	address	 the	demand	 for	crop	
insurance	in	Finland.	Because	there	have	not	been	crop	insurance	products	available	for	
Finnish	 farmers,	 hypothetical	 products	 are	 evaluated.	 Further	 the	 prospects	 of	 public	
policy	are	evaluated	ex	ante	instead	of	ex	post	policy	evaluation.		To	our	knowledge	we	
are	the	first	to	study	price	anchoring	effect	 in	CE	on	crop	 insurance.	 In	addition	to	our	
knowledge	 three	 step	process	 used	 in	 the	 IV	 article	 has	not	 applied	 in	 crop	 insurance	
studies	before.		
This	 work	 forms	 the	 basis	 for	 viable	 crop	 insurance	 products	 in	 Finland.	 The	 re-
search	results	were	expected	to	benefit	farmers,	the	government	and	insurance	compa-
nies.	The	results	obtained	in	this	thesis	study	also	provide	implications	for	how	the	Finn-
ish	government	and	also	the	EU	should	alter	legislation	in	order	to	promote	crop	insur-
ance	 market	 development.	 In	 addition,	 insurance	 companies	 can	 gain	 valuable	 infor-
mation	 from	the	study	about	 the	crop	 insurance	markets	and	the	 factors	affecting	 the	
demand	 for	 crop	 insurance	 in	 Finland.	 Viable	 crop	 insurance	markets	 are	 expected	 to	
lead	to	enhanced	resilience	of	farms	to	crop	losses.		
	
2. Material and methods 
2.1. Research data 
The	 data	 used	 in	 articles	 I,	 III	 and	 IV	 were	 collected	 through	 a	 questionnaire	 sent	 to	
5,000	 farmers	 in	 2012.	 To	 ensure	 representative	 sample,	 all	 Finnish	 farms	 eligible	 for	
agricultural	support	was	selected	as	universe.	Sampling	was	made	according	to	farm	size	
and	production	 sector.	 Selected	 sample	was	evaluated	 to	be	 representative	among	all	
Finnish	farms	(Liesivaara	et	al.	2013).	The	questionnaire	included	a	CE	design	and	multi-
ple	Likert-scale	questions	eliciting	farmers’	perceptions	of	risk,	risk	management	strate-
gies,	risk	attitudes	and	attitudes	towards	insuring	against	crop	losses.	The	response	rate	
of	 the	 final	 survey	was	 23%,	 and	 1,170	 farmers	 thus	 returned	 the	 questionnaire.	We	
motivated	the	farmers	to	complete	the	questionnaire	with	two	prizes	that	were	drawn	
among	 the	 returned	questionnaire	 forms.	A	 comprehensive	overview	of	 the	question-
naire	and	the	farmers’	responses	can	be	obtained	from	Liesivaara	et	al.	(2013)	(in	Finn-
ish).		
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A	 split	 sample	design	was	created	 to	control	 the	price	anchoring	effect	 in	 the	CE.	
Thus,	 three	 different	 efficient	 designs	 were	 created	 with	 varying	 price	 levels,	 namely	
low,	high	and	 the	whole	price	 range.	Every	design	had	42	different	 choice	cards.	Thus	
the	pooled	 research	data	consists	of	126	different	choice	cards.	Price	anchoring	effect	
was	studied	in	article	I.	The	pooled	dataset	was	used	in	articles	III	and	IV.	Another	split	
was	made	regarding	government	disaster	relief.	The	status	of	government’s	role	in	crop	
damage	compensation	was	predefined,	and	this	was	studied	in	article	III	of	this	thesis.		
In	the	CE	designs	created	for	the	questionnaire,	farmers	were	asked	to	choose	the	
most	suitable	crop	insurance	product	from	two	alternatives.	Farmers	could	also	opt	not	
to	 choose	 crop	 insurance	 at	 all.	 Six	 crop	 insurance	 cards	with	 varying	 attribute	 levels	
were	 shown	 to	 every	 respondent	 (Figure	 3).	 The	 crop	 insurance	 attributes	 chosen	 for	
the	CE	design	were	the	price	of	the	crop	 insurance,	the	deductible,	the	expected	com-
pensation	and	the	type	of	 insurance.	The	deductible	describes	the	share	of	 losses	that	
farmers	must	bear	by	themselves.	The	expected	compensation	is	the	estimated	average	
compensation	 (€/hectare)	 when	 losses	 exceed	 the	 deductible	 level.	 The	 levels	 of	 ex-
pected	 compensation	 attribute	 varied	 randomly.	 Thus	 the	 levels	 were	 not	 nested	 to-
gether	with	 the	deductible	 attribute.	 The	 insurance	 type	describes	whether	 the	 insur-
ance	is	based	on	the	individual	farm	yield	or	some	predefined	index.	The	levels	of	crop	
insurance	 attributes	 are	 shown	 in	 Appendix	 I.	 Before	 the	 respondents	 were	 asked	 to	
complete	the	CE,	all	attributes	used	in	the	survey	were	described	in	detail.		
	
INSURANCE CARD 
1  Insurance 1 Insurance 2 No purchase 
Insurance premium 
€/hectare  12 16 
I would not pur-
chase insurance 
Deductible  20% 20% 
Insurance type  Yield index insurance, farm inspection is not needed. 
Farm yield insurance, inspection of 
loss at the farm is needed. 
Expected compensation 
€/hectare  300 600 
MY CHOICE  □ □ □ 
Figure	3.	Example	of	a	choice	card.		
	
Farm	accountancy	data	network	(FADN)	data	were	used	in	article	II,	 in	which	indi-
vidual	 farm	 yields	 were	 compared	 with	 regional	 yields.	 FADN	 data	 are	 collected	 and	
stored	by	 the	Natural	Resources	 Institute	 Finland.	Regional	 yields	were	obtained	 from	
the	 Information	centre	of	 the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	and	Forestry	 (part	of	 the	Natural	
Resources	Institute	Finland	since	2015).	
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2.2. Research methods 
A	choice	experiment	(CE)	approach	and	discrete	choice	models	were	used	in	articles	I,	III	
and	IV	of	this	thesis.	The	rationale	for	using	CE	is	that	there	are	no	crop	insurance	mar-
kets	in	Finland.	Thus,	we	relied	on	hypothetical	products	instead	of	actuarial	data.	In	CE,	
hypothetical	 choice	 situations	 are	 created	 with	 two	 or	 more	 options	 from	 which	 the	
respondent	is	asked	to	choose.	In	addition,	the	attributes	of	the	choice	options	are	var-
ied	over	situations	in	order	to	create	the	variation	needed	for	estimation	of	the	underly-
ing	 preferences.	 CE	 is	 an	 application	 of	 the	 characteristics	 theory	 of	 value	 (Lancaster	
1966),	combined	with	random	utility	theory.	Based	on	random	utility	theory,	we	assume	
that	farmers	can	choose	the	best	alternative	from	different	insurance	product	choices	in	
the	choice	set.	Moreover,	the	overall	utility	from	a	good	can	be	divided	into	attributes.	
The	 first	 proponent	 of	 choice	 modelling	 theory,	 Daniel	 McFadden,	 was	 awarded	 the	
Nobel	Prize	in	Economics	for	his	work	(McFadden	2001).		
CE	 data	 are	modelled	with	 discrete	 choice	models,	 such	 as	 the	multinomial	 logit	
model.	The	multinomial	logit	model	is	derived	under	the	assumption	that	the	error	term	
is	 independent	 and	 identically	 distributed	 for	 all	 individuals	 (McFadden	 1974).	 Limita-
tions	of	the	assumption	about	the	independent	and	identically	distributed	error	term	in	
the	multinomial	logit	model	can	be	obviated	by	using	more	flexible	mixed	logit	and	error	
component	logit	models.	These	models	are	used	in	articles	I	and	III.	For	mixed	and	error	
component	 logit	 models,	 NLogit	 software	 was	 used.	Mixed	 logit	 probabilities	 are	 the	
integrals	 of	 standard	 logit	 probabilities	 over	 a	 density	 of	 parameters	 (Train	 2003).	 In	
article	lV,	the	decision	of	farmers	to	insure	against	crop	losses	was	modelled	with	a	mul-
tinomial	probit	model	and	SAS	software	was	used.		
With	discrete	choice	models,	the	utility	of	respondents	is	measured.	Thus,	the	esti-
mated	model	coefficients	are	not	 interpretable	 in	economic	terms.	Therefore,	 in	order	
to	 reveal	 the	overall	WTP	 for	 crop	 insurance	products,	 implicit	 prices	 (IP)	 are	derived.	
Implicit	price	estimates	of	 crop	 insurance	attributes	are	derived	by	dividing	 the	coeffi-
cient	of	the	crop	insurance	attribute	by	the	price	coefficient.		
The	 first	 applications	 of	 CE	 were	 in	 travel	 demand	 modelling.	 However,	 the	 CE	
method	has	 been	extensively	 applied	 to	product	 development,	 the	 estimation	of	 con-
sumer	WTP	for	different	products,	and	in	studies	evaluating	WTP	for	public	goods.	De-
spite	CE	having	been	used	in	many	research	fields,	applications	of	CE	to	crop	insurance	
are	rare.	However,	a	few	examples	exist.	Nganje	et	al.	(2008)	examined	preferences	for	
holistic	crop	and	health	insurance	among	US	farmers,	while	Mercade	et	al.	(2009)	ana-
lysed	Catalonian	vegetable	producers’	preferences	for	crop	insurance	with	CE.	Thus,	our	
analyses	in	articles	I	and	III	(and	to	some	extent	in	article	IV)	represent	a	major	contribu-
tion	to	the	current	literature	on	crop	insurance	demand	modelling	with	CE	data.		
Stochastic	simulation	was	used	in	article	II	of	this	thesis.	Stochastic	simulation	trac-
es	the	evolution	of	different	variables	 that	change	randomly	with	certain	probabilities.	
Thus	there	is	a	pattern	in	how	the	variables	change	in	the	model,	but	there	are	also	ran-
dom	changes	 in	the	variables.	Agriculture	 is	a	complex	system.	Stochastic	simulation	is	
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flexible	enough	to	mimic	real	life,	where	the	real	system	is	represented	in	the	form	of	a	
simulation	 model.	 With	 a	 stochastic	 simulation	 model,	 we	 answer	 “what	 if”	 types	 of	
questions	about	the	real	world.	Thus,	stochastic	simulation	can	help	the	decision	maker	
to	systemically	assess	what	might	happen	under	the	complex	interactions	between	the	
model	parameters.	The	overall	aim	of	stochastic	simulation	 is	 to	determine	probability	
distributions	 of	 the	 consequences	 for	 different	 decisions.	 Ultimately,	 this	 enables	 the	
decision	maker	to	compare	different	options	and	make	better	choices	among	the	alter-
natives	(Hardaker	et	al.	2004).				
In	the	stochastic	simulation	models	constructed	in	article	II,	Monte	Carlo	sampling	
was	used	as	 the	 sampling	 technique	 to	 study	 risky	 situations.	 Simulation	models	were	
created	with	@Risk	software	in	Microsoft	Excel.	In	Monte	Carlo	sampling,	random	num-
bers	 are	 sampled	 from	a	 priori	 specified	 distributions.	 Each	 of	 the	 obtained	 iterations	
represents	 a	 possible	 combination	 of	 values	 of	 the	 specified	 stochastic	 elements	 that	
could	 occur,	 taking	 into	 account	 correlations	 specified	 for	 the	 simulation	 model.	 The	
resulting	 values	 of	 output	 variables	 from	 iterations	 are	 computed	 and	 restored.	 The	
distribution	of	each	of	the	output	variables	will	converge	to	a	stable	distribution	when	
the	number	of	iterations	is	large	enough	(Hardaker	et	al.	2004).	
In	addition	to	stochastic	simulation,	a	 linear	programming	model	(Hazell	&	Norton	
1986)	was	 used	 in	 article	 II	 to	 examine	 farmers’	 choices	 for	 the	 optimal	 cover	 (which	
determines	the	deductible	 level)	and	scale	(which	determines	the	expected	compensa-
tion)	in	area	yield	index	insurance.	The	objective	was	to	find	those	cover	and	scale	levels	
that	result	in	the	smallest	possible	yield	variability	using	historical	FADN	yield	data.	Op-
timisation	was	performed	separately	for	each	farm	in	the	dataset	with	the	Excel	Solver	
add-in.		
	
3. Results and discussion 
This	 section	 summarises	 and	 discusses	 the	 results	 of	 the	 four	 articles.	 The	 results	 are	
presented	and	discussed	in	three	separate	subsections,	because	some	of	the	articles	had	
overlapping	objectives.	The	results	presented	in	articles	I	and	III	are	the	first	estimates	of	
farmers’	 preferences	 and	WTP	 for	 crop	 insurance	 attributes	 in	 Finland,	 and	 these	 are	
presented	and	discussed	first.	Articles	I,	III	and	IV	provide	comprehensive	insights	which	
factors	affect	the	decision	of	Finnish	farmers	to	 insure	against	crop	 losses.	Findings	re-
garding	these	issues	are	presented	in	section	3.2.	The	final	part	of	this	section	introduc-
es	the	results	in	article	II,	which	considers	the	feasibility	of	area	yield	index	insurance	in	
Finland.	
3.1. Demand for crop insurance and farmers' willingness to pay 
for crop insurance attributes 
The	 first	objective	of	 this	 thesis	 study	was	 to	 reveal	 the	demand	 for	 crop	 insurance	 in	
Finland.	This	was	analysed	in	articles	I,	III	and	IV.	The	second	objective	was	to	investigate	
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farmers’	preferences	and	willingness	to	pay	(WTP)	for	crop	 insurance	attributes.	These	
were	analysed	in	articles	I	and	III.	The	obtained	results	revealed	that	there	is	demand	for	
crop	insurance	in	Finland.	An	insurance	product	was	chosen	in	46.5%	of	the	cases	in	the	
entire	dataset.	In	other	words,	this	is	the	proportion	of	crop	insurance	product	cards	for	
which	 an	 insurance	product	was	 chosen.	 Figure	4	presents	 the	 relative	proportions	of	
chosen	crop	insurance	products	with	different	price	levels.	It	illustrates	that	the	demand	
reacts	to	the	price	of	insurance,	but	is	inelastic	over	the	whole	price	range	i.e.	the	rela-
tive	change	in	insurance	cards	chosen	was	smaller	than	the	relative	change	in	the	price	
of	 insurance.	 This	 observation	 is	 in	 line	with	previous	 studies	 on	 the	 elasticity	 of	 crop	
insurance	demand	(Goodwin	1993,	Coble	&	Barnett	2013).	
	
	
Figure	4.	Proportion	of	crop	 insurance	product	cards	chosen	 in	a	choice	experiment	 in	
relation	to	the	price	level.	
	
Table	2	presents	the	median	WTP	of	Finnish	farmers	for	different	crop	insurance	at-
tributes.	 Implicit	prices	(IP)	were	derived	with	a	mixed	logit	model	using	the	entire	da-
taset.	Description	of	 the	mixed	 logit	model,	parameter	values,	and	how	median	WTP's	
were	derived	are	described	in	Appendices.	 	Finnish	farmers’	median	WTP	for	a	10%	in-
crease	in	the	deductible	was	-1.60	Euros.	Thus,	when	the	crop	insurance	deductible	in-
creased	by	10%,	the	WTP	of	farmers	decreased	by	1.60	Euros.	The	median	WTP	for	the	
expected	 compensation	was	 3.40	 Euros/hectare.	 Thus,	when	 the	 expected	 compensa-
tion	was	increased	by	100	Euros,	the	WTP	of	farmers	increased	on	average	by	3.40	Eu-
ros.	These	results	imply	that	the	effect	of	the	expected	indemnity	on	the	overall	WTP	of	
farmers	for	crop	insurance	products	was	larger	than	that	of	the	deductible.		
The	median	WTP	of	farmers	for	farm	insurance	was	-3.40	Euros	when	the	WTP	for	
index	insurance	was	restricted	to	0	Euros.	Thus,	farmers	were	willing	to	pay	3.40	Euros	
more	for	index	insurance	than	for	farm	insurance.	This	slightly	surprising	result	may	be	
because	the	administration	of	the	agricultural	policy	leads	to	extensive	bureaucracy	and	
inspections	at	the	farm	level.	This	will	also	lead	to	higher	transaction	costs.	It	may	well	
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be	 that	 farmers	 are	 reluctant	 to	 consider	 more	 farm-level	 inspections.	 Furthermore,	
with	index	insurance,	these	inspections	at	the	farm	level	could	be	avoided.	This	was	also	
mentioned	in	the	questionnaire.	
	
Table	2.	Median	implicit	prices	(IP)	of	crop	insurance	attributes	in	Finland.	
Crop	insurance	attributes	 Median	IP1	
Deductible 10%	 -1.60	
Expected	indemnity	€100/hectare	 3.40	
Farm	insurance2	 -3.04	
1	Median	IPs	based	on	the	procedure	proposed	by	Krinsky	and	Robb	(1986).	
2	IP	for	index	insurance	is	restricted	to	0.	
	
In	article	I,	the	impact	of	varying	price	levels	in	the	choice	design	was	considered	to	
examine	the	effect	of	starting	point	bias.	Starting	point	bias	in	CE	studies	is	the	influence	
of	the	cost	vector	chosen	by	the	researcher	on	respondents’	answers.	Previous	research	
has	 indicated	 a	 danger	 that	 starting	 point	 bias	 will	 be	 created	 when	 the	 researcher	
chooses	 the	 attribute	 levels	 in	 the	 CE	 design,	 and	 that	 respondents	 will	 use	 these	 to	
make	assumptions	about	attribute	values	(Kragt	2013,	Luisetti	et	al.	2011,	Mørkbak	et	al.	
2010).	In	their	seminal	work	Tversky	and	Kahneman	(1974)	framed	the	anchoring	prob-
lem	and	stated	that	different	starting	points	yield	different	estimates	 i.e.	 respondents’	
answers	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 starting	 point	 and	 estimates	 are	 biased	 toward	 the	 initial	
values.	Such	anchoring	by	the	researcher	may	particularly	be	present	in	the	case	of	non-
market	goods	and	hypothetical	products	not	yet	existing	on	the	market,	such	as	in	evolv-
ing	crop	insurance	markets	in	Finland.	In	article	I,	farmers’	choices	were	modelled	with	
mixed	logit	models	for	three	different	price	regimes	with	varying	price	ranges.		
Analysis	of	the	different	price	regimes	revealed	that	the	WTP	of	farmers	for	crop	in-
surance	varied	significantly	according	to	whether	low	or	high	prices	were	shown.	Thus,	
our	results	support	the	findings	of	previous	CE	price	anchoring	studies.	The	most	reliable	
estimates	were	obtained	when	 the	whole	price	 range	of	 the	crop	 insurance	attributes	
was	presented	to	the	farmers.	The	results	suggest	that	the	crop	insurance	markets	that	
are	starting	to	emerge	in	Finland	are	dominated	by	knowledge	of	premium	setting.	Pri-
vate	crop	insurance	companies	can	take	advantage	of	this	price	anchoring	problem,	and	
support	targeted	at	farmers	will	be	easily	transferred	elsewhere.	Farmers’	knowledge	of	
fair	premiums	and	the	ability	to	compare	different	crop	insurance	products	is	essential.	
Thus,	 increasing	awareness	among	 farmers	of	crop	 insurance	products	would	be	more	
efficient	 than	 supporting	 crop	 insurance	 with	 fixed	 percentages.	 Analysis	 of	 farmers’	
WTP	for	crop	insurance	attributes	also	revealed	that	the	expected	indemnity	was	a	more	
important	factor	than	the	deductible.	Therefore,	the	30	per	cent	deductible	level	set	for	
subsidised	crop	insurance	products	is	not	a	major	obstacle	for	the	development	of	pub-
lic–private	crop	insurance	products	in	the	EU.	
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In	article	III,	the	data-splitting	factor	was	the	prospect	of	government	disaster	relief.	
The	 data	 were	modelled	 with	 error	 component	 logit	 models	 to	 examine	 the	market-
distorting	effect	caused	by	a	government	policy,	 free	ad	hoc	disaster	relief.	Farmers	 in	
the	two	samples	were	given	different	status	quo	options.	The	role	of	government	disas-
ter	 relief	 was	 included	 in	 the	 CE	 setting	 as	 a	 constant	 variable.	 Before	 farmers	 were	
asked	to	complete	the	insurance	choices	in	the	questionnaire,	it	was	stated	in	half	of	the	
questionnaire	forms	that	the	government	will	not	under	any	circumstances	grant	disas-
ter	relief	in	the	case	of	a	catastrophic	event.	In	the	other	half	of	the	questionnaire	forms,	
it	was	stated	that	government	disaster	relief	is	possible,	but	the	condition	for	compensa-
tion	is	that	farmers	have	purchased	private	crop	insurance.		
The	availability	of	disaster	relief	did	not	have	a	major	effect	on	the	number	of	 in-
surance	 cards	 chosen.	However,	 the	WTP	of	 farmers	 for	 crop	 insurance	attributes	dif-
fered	 between	 the	 two	 samples.	 Thus	 farmers	 altered	 their	 choices	 whether	 govern-
ment	disaster	relief	was	present	or	not.	The	obtained	results	revealed	that	government	
involvement	 in	 crop	 insurance	markets	would	 reduce	 the	WTP	 of	 the	 deductible.	 The	
difference	was	 statistically	 significant	 and	 the	deductible	 attribute	was	23%	 smaller	 in	
the	 sample	where	 government	 relief	was	 possible	 compared	 to	 the	 sample	where	 ad	
hoc	disaster	relief	was	not	granted.	In	contrast	to	the	deductible	attribute,	farmers	were	
willing	 to	pay	more	 for	 the	expected	 indemnity	of	 crop	 insurance	when	disaster	 relief	
was	possible	 following	 the	purchase	of	 voluntary	 crop	 insurance.	 The	WTP	 for	 the	ex-
pected	 indemnity	attribute	was	8.4%	higher	 in	 the	sample	where	government	disaster	
relief	was	possible	compared	to	the	sample	where	ad	hoc	payments	were	not	possible.		
The	implicit	prices	for	both	insurance	types	were	higher	in	the	subsample	for	which	
disaster	relief	was	no	longer	granted.	Thus,	the	level	of	WTP	for	farm	or	 index	crop	in-
surance	products	was	lower	when	it	was	stated	that	the	government	would	intervene	in	
the	crop	insurance	markets.	In	addition,	the	confidence	intervals	of	WTP	estimates	were	
wider	in	the	sample	where	disaster	relief	was	not	possible.	This	implies	higher	variance	
in	WTP,	 i.e.	more	heterogeneous	utility	between	the	farmers,	when	government	 inter-
vention	will	not	occur.	This	is	not	surprising,	as	farmers	who	would	be	more	reluctant	to	
purchase	crop	 insurance	may	have	done	so	 in	order	 to	be	eligible	 for	disaster	 relief	 in	
the	future.		
The	 demand	 for	 crop	 insurance	 is	 encouraged	 by	 introducing	 insurance	 premium	
subsidies.	This	 is	a	standard	policy	 in	developed	countries	 (Smith	&	Glauber	2012).	Ac-
cording	 to	our	 results,	 if	 the	government	wants	 to	pay	ad	hoc	disaster	 relief,	 the	crop	
insurance	premium	subsidy	level	for	cereal	crops	needs	to	be	increased	as	disaster	relief	
lowers	 farmers	WTP	 for	 crop	 insurance.	 This	 will	 lead	 to	 extensive	 use	 of	 taxpayers’	
money.	Thus,	the	government	should	follow	a	simple	rule.	It	should	either	pay	disaster	
relief	payments	and	refrain	from	insurance	premium	subsidies	or	introduce	an	insurance	
premium	subsidy,	but	refrain	from	disaster	relief	payments.	
However,	when	extensive	crop	damage	is	realised,	there	is	strong	pressure	to	help	
farmers	 in	 distress.	 This	makes	 the	 situation	 complicated	 for	 the	 politicians	 in	 charge.	
The	problem	 is	 that	 if	 the	 rules	 for	disaster	 relief	 are	 vague,	decision	makers	will	 also	
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have	 the	 urge	 to	 help	 farmers	 in	 situations	 that	 could	 be	 dealt	with	 using	market	 in-
struments.	This	may	lead	to	a	state	where	the	market	niche	for	crop	insurance	between	
the	deductible	and	disaster	 relief	 is	 too	 small.	 This	 could	be	avoided	by	defining	 cata-
strophic	risks	and	those	situations	in	which	government	disaster	relief	is	permitted.	Risks	
outside	this	range	could	then	be	insured	with	crop	insurance.		
3.2. Factors affecting the demand for crop insurance 
The	second	objective	of	this	thesis	study	was	to	investigate	the	factors	underlying	crop	
insurance	uptake.	These	were	studied	in	articles	I,	III	and	IV.	The	models	in	articles	I	and	
III	 included	socioeconomic	variables,	while	in	addition	to	these,	article	IV	examined	the	
effect	of	farmers	attitudes	towards	risk	on	the	decision	to	insure	against	crop	losses.		
Age	was	found	to	be	a	negative	and	significant	factor	in	all	of	the	models	of	articles	
I	and	III.	This	suggests	that	younger	farmers	are	more	likely	to	choose	crop	insurance	in	
Finland.	The	number	of	cultivated	hectares	was	found	to	be	positive	and	significant	in	all	
models.	Thus,	bigger	farms	are	more	likely	to	insure	against	crop	losses.	Further	models	
in	articles	 I	and	 IV	suggest	that	more	educated	farmers	are	more	 likely	to	choose	crop	
insurance.	These	results	are	in	line	with	previous	studies	on	crop	insurance	(e.g.	(Good-
win	1993,	Coble	et	al.	1996,	Sherrick	et	al.	2003,	Sherrick	et	al.	2004,	Ginder	et	al.	2009,	
Smith	&	Baquet	1996,	Mishra	&	Goodwin	2003).	
We	 found	 evidence	 of	 a	 possible	 adverse	 selection	 problem	 in	 future	 crop	 insur-
ance	schemes	in	Finland.	The	models	in	articles	III	and	IV	suggest	that	farmers	who	have	
received	CDC	payments	in	the	past	are	more	likely	to	choose	crop	insurance.	In	addition,	
as	 reported	 in	article,III	 farmers	 in	 the	northeastern	part	of	 Finland	were	 less	 likely	 to	
insure	 against	 crop	 losses.	 This	 result	 was	 further	 verified	 by	 the	model	 in	 article	 IV,	
which	revealed	that	farmers	in	southern	and	western	parts	of	Finland	were	more	likely	
to	choose	crop	insurance.	This	result	is	not	surprising,	as	crop	production	is	concentrat-
ed	in	these	parts	of	the	country.	Furthermore,	it	was	found	that	crop	production	farms	
were	more	 likely	 to	 insure.	 In	 addition,	 in	 article	 IV	 it	was	 found	 that	 dairy	 farms	 are	
more	likely	to	choose	crop	insurance,	whereas	other	animal	producers	was	less	likely	to	
insure	against	crop	losses.		
As	reported	in	article	III,	farms	with	a	larger	rented	cultivated	area	more	highly	val-
ued	the	expected	indemnity	attribute	and	were	less	concerned	about	the	price	attribute	
in	crop	insurance	contracts.	Farmers	operating	with	a	high	proportion	of	rented	agricul-
tural	area	are	more	exposed	to	yield	and	price	variability	in	their	business.	This	is	due	to	
lowered	risk	management	at	the	field	level,	as	well	as	lease	payments,	which	lower	the	
profit	margin	per	hectare.		
In	article	IV,	producers’	risk	attitude	factors	were	included	in	the	estimation	of	crop	
insurance	adoption.	 In	a	three-stage	procedure	where	farmers’	 risk	attitudes	were	dis-
entangled	from	farm	and	farmer	characteristics,	 it	was	found	that	risk-averse	and	risk-
neutral	farmers	were	less	likely	to	choose	crop	insurance	than	risk	seeking	farmers.	This	
result	 is	 surprising,	 because	 in	 expected	 utility	 theory	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 a	 risk-averse	
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decision	maker	always	fully	insures.	This	result	may	be	explained	by	the	observation	of	
van	Winsen	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 that	 risk-averse	 farmers	 already	 use	 other	means	 to	 handle	
crop	risks,	which	reduces	the	need	for	crop	insurance.	This	may	well	also	be	the	case	in	
Finland.	 In	 addition,	 our	 result	 is	 in	 line	 with	 finding	 by	 Hellerstein	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 that	
more	risk-averse	farmers	are	less	likely	to	have	crop	insurance.		
In	the	CE	design	created	for	the	farm	survey,	six	crop	insurance	choice	cards	were	
shown	to	the	respondents.	Some	28%	of	the	farmers	did	not	choose	any	of	the	offered	
insurance	 alternatives	 from	 the	 six	 choice	 cards	 presented.	 Thus,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	
choice	to	insure,	the	repeated	rejection	of	crop	insurance	in	the	CE	context	was	studied	
in	article	 IV	with	a	 logit	model.	Similar	results	were	obtained	from	this	model	to	those	
with	the	model	for	crop	insurance	choice.	The	number	of	cultivated	hectares	had	a	neg-
ative	effect	on	the	repeated	rejection	of	 insurance	products.	Thus,	for	farms	that	culti-
vated	larger	numbers	of	hectares,	it	was	less	likely	for	the	famer	to	reject	all	crop	insur-
ance	products.	Furthermore,	if	a	farm	had	received	CDC	payments	in	the	past,	it	was	less	
likely	to	reject	all	crop	insurance	products.	The	variable	‘other	animals’	(other	than	dairy	
farms)	was	positive.	Thus,	these	farms	were	more	likely	to	reject	all	offered	crop	insur-
ance	products.		
In	 the	questionnaire,	 farmers’	attitudes	 towards	private	 insurance	companies	and	
the	 government’s	 future	 role	 in	 crop	 damage	 compensation	were	 elicited.	 These	 atti-
tudes	were	included	in	the	models	in	article	IV	to	examine	whether	they	have	an	effect	
on	the	crop	insurance	choices.	More	than	50%	of	farmers	believed	that	the	government	
should	compensate	crop	losses	in	the	future.	This	is	in	line	with	what	has	been	observed	
also	 for	 livestock	 insurance	 in	 Finland	 (Heikkilä	 et	 al.	 2016).	 In	 addition,	 some	 35%	of	
farmers	 stated	 that	 they	 do	not	 trust	 in	 insurance	 companies	 as	much	 as	 the	 govern-
ment.	Farmers’	attitudes	towards	insurance	companies	or	the	role	of	the	government	in	
crop	damage	compensation	in	the	future	had	no	statistically	significant	effect	in	explain-
ing	 the	 repeated	 rejection	 of	 crop	 insurance.	 This	 result	 is	 encouraging	 for	 insurance	
companies	 and	 the	 government.	 It	 provides	 evidence	 that	 negative	 attitude	 towards	
private	insurers	or	expectations	of	government	involvement	in	crop	damage	compensa-
tion	in	the	future	will	not	pose	a	major	obstacle	to	the	development	of	the	crop	insur-
ance	market	in	Finland.	
3.3. Area yield index insurance: A Feasible option for a future 
yield risk management tool in Finland? 
In	article	II,	the	feasibility	of	an	area	yield	index	insurance	scheme	for	Finnish	agriculture	
was	 explored.	Moreover,	 the	 efficiency	of	 area	 yield	 index	 insurance	was	 investigated	
and	the	problem	of	systemic	risks	of	area	yields	was	addressed.	Area	yield	insurance	is	a	
type	of	 index	 insurance	where	 the	 index	 that	 triggers	 indemnity	payments	 is	 the	yield	
for	 a	 particular	 area.	 Area	 yields	 are	 compared	 to	 a	 reference	 yield	 for	 the	 area.	 The	
reference	yield	is	typically	a	moving	average	of	past	area	yields.	In	article	II,	area	yields	
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from	 15	 ELY	 Centre	 (Centres	 for	 Economic	 Development,	 Transport	 and	 the	 Environ-
ment)	were	used.	Farm	yields	were	obtained	from	FADN	data.		
In	index	insurances,	a	common	problem	is	basis	risk,	which	is	present	when	the	in-
dex	and	individual	farm	yields	do	not	correlate.	Besides	the	fact	that	basis	risk	decreases	
the	efficiency	of	index	insurance	schemes,	it	is	not	tolerated	in	subsidized	crop	insuranc-
es	in	the	new	CAP	(European	Commission	2013).	However,	EU	and	government	support	
for	index	insurance	is	possible,	although	the	new	CAP	states	that	the	yield	or	index	used	
to	 trigger	 indemnity	payments	 should	 follow	 the	 yield	distribution	of	 individual	 farms.	
The	advantage	with	 index	 insurance	 is	 that	 it	allows	two	main	problems	of	crop	 insur-
ances	related	to	asymmetric	information,	i.e.	moral	hazard	and	adverse	selection,	to	be	
avoided.	This	is	because	yield	indexes	are	outside	the	influence	of	farmers.	
Correlations	between	farm	and	area	yields	are	low	in	all	Finnish	areas.	The	Pearson	
correlation	 coefficient,	measuring	 the	 degree	 to	which	 farm	 and	 area	 yields	move	 to-
gether,	is	on	average	0.38	for	spring	wheat,	0.40	for	barley	and	0.37	for	oats.	These	re-
sults	suggest	that	weather	events	are	highly	local	and	yields	are	consequently	not	highly	
correlated	between	areas	and	individual	farms.	Furthermore,	Myyrä	et	al.	(2011)	found	
that	 there	 is	 high	 variation	 in	 precipitation	 in	 Finland,	 whereas	 temperature	 is	 more	
systemic.	Thus,	farmers	face	similar	temperatures	during	the	year,	but	rainfall	may	have	
a	significant	 impact	on	the	yields	of	an	 individual	 farm.	Therefore,	simply	offering	area	
yields	as	an	index	would	not	be	efficient	if	the	number	of	areas	from	which	the	average	
yield	 is	calculated	 is	not	 increased.	 In	collecting	and	publishing	the	yield	data,	the	gov-
ernment	 can	 have	 a	 significant	 role.	 For	 example,	 the	 government	 could	 consider	
providing	area	yield	data	with	a	smaller	area	division	than	the	current	15	ELY	Centres.		
To	study	the	efficiency	of	area	yield	index	insurance,	linear	programming	was	used.	
The	cover	and	scale	were	individually	optimised	for	each	farm	in	the	dataset.	The	cover	
is	the	share	of	the	yield	risk	that	farmers	must	bear	by	themselves.	If	the	cover	level	is	
70%,	 the	 implicit	 deductible	 paid	 by	 farmers	 is	 equivalent	 to	 30%	 of	 the	 income.	 The	
scale	defines	how	large	a	share	of	the	reference	yield	is	insured.	For	example,	if	the	scale	
is	100%,	premiums	and	indemnity	payments	are	based	exactly	on	reference	yields.		
The	results	 in	article	II	suggest	that	the	overall	efficiency	of	area	yield	insurance	is	
not	 high	 in	 Finland,	 as	 half	 of	 the	 farms	would	 not	 gain	 any	 benefit	 from	 it.	 This	 also	
implies	that	the	demand	for	such	 insurance	would	be	 limited.	When	the	cover	was	re-
stricted	to	70%	and	scale	to	100%	of	area	yields,	farm	income	volatility	only	decreased	
for	 28.3%	 of	 farms	 due	 to	 area	 yield	 insurance.	 The	 average	 reduction	 in	 variance	 of	
farm	 income	 on	 those	 farms	 was	 only	 11.1%.	 If	 the	maximum	 level	 of	 cover	 was	 in-
creased	to	90%	and	the	scale	was	unrestricted,	volatility	 in	farm	income	decreased	for	
48.1%	of	farms	in	the	dataset.	Furthermore,	the	average	reduction	in	variance	increased	
to	32.5%.		
In	addition	to	the	efficiency	of	area	yield	index	insurance,	the	systemic	risks	of	index	
insurance	based	on	area	yields	were	examined	in	article	II.	Systemic	risk	stems	from	the	
nature	 of	many	weather	 events.	 Basically,	 this	means	 that	 there	 is	 a	 high	 correlation	
between	 average	 crop	 yields	 in	 different	 regions	 due	 to	 similarities	 in	weather	 condi-
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tions.	 In	this	type	of	environmental	risk,	pooling	of	area	yields	 is	not	possible.	The	sys-
temic	 nature	 of	 area	 yields	 was	 considered	 using	 a	 stochastic	 simulation	 model.	 The	
stochastic	simulation	model	is	described	in	appendices.	The	results	suggested	that	area	
yields	 are	 highly	 systemic.	 Thus,	 the	 longer	 tail,	 i.e.	 the	 high	 possibility	 of	 high	 losses	
with	systemic	yields,	causes	hesitation	in	insurance	companies.	Ultimately,	this	leads	to	
a	considerably	higher	probability	of	large	losses.	Thus,	farmers	will	pay	higher	premiums,	
as	systemic	risks	need	to	be	taken	into	account	in	insurance	pricing.	
	
4. Conclusions 
This	 thesis	 study	was	 the	 first	 to	comprehensively	examine	crop	 insurances	 in	Finland.	
The	results	obtained	in	this	study	form	the	basis	for	predicting	the	future	development	
of	 crop	 insurance	markets	 in	 Finland.	 The	 results	 from	 this	 thesis	 demonstrated	 that	
there	is	demand	for	crop	insurance	in	Finland,	and	Finnish	farmers	consider	crop	insur-
ance	as	an	option	for	yield	risk	management.	The	price	was	found	to	be	the	main	factor	
affecting	 the	 level	of	demand.	The	 results	were	 sensitive	 to	 the	CE	design.	 In	addition	
government	actions’	 regarding	disaster	 relief	was	 found	to	affect	 the	WTP	 for	crop	 in-
surance.	Free	government	disaster	relief	lowered	the	WTP	compared	to	situation	where	
disaster	relief	was	not	granted.	Multiple	farm	and	farmer	characteristics,	such	age,	farm	
size,	production	sector	and	risk	attitudes,	were	found	to	affect	the	demand.	One	of	the	
aspects	that	were	studied	is	the	possibility	for	area	yield	insurance	as	risk	management	
tool.	Area	yield	insurance	was	found	to	be	ineffective	and	thus	not	viable	for	EU	support	
due	to	high	basis	risk.		
Before	 all	 Finnish	 farmers	 are	 ready	 to	 purchase	 crop	 insurance	 products,	
knowledge	of	crop	 insurance	premium	setting	should	be	strengthened.	The	crop	 insur-
ance	markets	 that	 are	 starting	 to	 emerge	 in	 Finland	 are	 dominated	 by	 knowledge	 of	
premium	 setting.	 Starting	point	 bias	 created	by	 insurers	 can	be	 reduced	by	 increasing	
awareness	among	farmers	of	crop	insurance	premium	setting.	In	addition,	the	ability	of	
extension	services	to	evaluate	crop	insurance	products	should	be	strengthened.			
Analysis	of	the	WTP	for	crop	insurance	products	among	farmers	revealed	that	they	
are	more	concerned	about	the	expected	compensation	and	price	attribute.	Thus,	the	30	
per	cent	deductible	 level	set	 for	subsidised	crop	 insurance	products	 in	EU	 legislation	 is	
not	an	obstacle	 for	 the	development	of	 crop	 insurance	products	 in	Finland.	 Increasing	
the	deductible	did	not	lower	farmers’	WTP	as	much	as	increasing	the	price	of	insurance	
or	 lowering	the	expected	compensation.	This	 is	an	encouraging	result	 for	 the	develop-
ment	of	public–private	crop	insurance	products	in	Finland.		
At	present,	the	CAP	limits	the	possibilities	to	apply	crop	insurance	premium	subsi-
dies.	 The	 results	 of	 this	 thesis	 should	 encourage	 EU	policymakers	 to	 consider	 a	 larger	
portfolio	of	risk	management	tools	for	farmers	than	is	possible	in	the	current	legislation.	
For	example,	 the	results	 from	different	choice	models	 revealed	that	 farmers	preferred	
index	 insurance	over	farm-specific	 insurance.	However,	the	EU	legislation	prohibits	the	
development	 of	 subsidised	 index	 insurances	 if	 the	 basis	 risk	 of	 these	 products	 is	 too	
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high.	Thus,	the	rules	of	support	for	index	insurance	should	be	relaxed	in	the	EU	in	order	
for	 area	 yield	 index	 insurance	 and	 other	 types	 of	 index	 insurances	 to	 be	 eligible	 as	 a	
public–private	crop	insurance	scheme	in	Finland	and	in	the	EU	at	large.	
By	relaxing	the	rules	 for	subsidized	crop	 insurance	set	by	the	EU,	the	efficiency	of	
area	 yield	 insurance	 could	 be	 increased.	When	 farmers	 are	 able	 to	 freely	 choose	 the	
cover	 level	 and	 scale	 of	 the	 insurance,	within	 some	 limits,	 the	 efficiency	 is	 greatly	 in-
creased.	However,	 a	 stochastic	 simulation	model	 revealed	 that	 an	 area	 yield	 index	 in-
surance	scheme	is	troublesome	from	the	insurers’	point	of	view.	The	results	from	article	
II	demonstrate	that	a	positive	correlation	with	area	yield	indices	increases	the	probabil-
ity	 of	maximum	possible	 losses	 for	 insurance	 companies.	 The	 government	 can	 reduce	
the	effect	of	 this	problem	by	providing	free	of	charge	or	subsidised	reinsurance	for	 in-
surance	companies.	
One	of	the	obstacles	for	the	development	of	viable	crop	insurance	markets	is	gov-
ernment	 disaster	 relief.	 Therefore,	 the	 government	 should	 either	make	 disaster	 relief	
payments	and	refrain	from	insurance	premium	subsidies	or	introduce	an	insurance	pre-
mium	subsidy,	but	refrain	from	disaster	relief	payments.	The	results	of	this	thesis	study	
indicated	that	disaster	relief	will	 lead	to	a	 lower	WTP	for	crop	insurance,	which	will	af-
fect	the	development	of	crop	 insurance	products	 in	Finland.	 If	disaster	relief	 is	permit-
ted,	 the	 government	 should	 create	 ex	 ante	 clear	 rules	 that	 define	 situations	 in	which	
disaster	can	be	granted.	This	would	also	give	policymakers	a	clear	limit	that	they	should	
not	cross,	and	risk	outside	this	limit	could	then	be	insured.	Another	option	for	the	gov-
ernment	is	to	grant	free	of	charge	reinsurance	to	insurance	companies.		
The	obtained	results	also	suggest	that	 future	crop	 insurance	schemes	are	 likely	to	
suffer	 from	adverse	 selection	problems,	 as	 farmers	who	have	 suffered	 crop	 losses	be-
fore	are	more	likely	to	buy	crop	insurance.	 Insurance	companies	need	to	take	this	 into	
account	in	actuarial	practices,	i.e.	they	have	to	collect	differing	premiums	from	farmers.	
Increasing	the	premium	rates	for	all	producers	is	not	an	option,	as	this	would	result	in	a	
higher	level	of	loss	risk	among	the	farmers	in	the	pool,	because	farmers	with	a	low	loss	
risk	will	be	the	first	to	cancel	their	participation	(Goodwin	1993).		
In	 contrast	 to	what	 the	 expected	 utility	 theory	 suggests,	 according	 to	 our	 results	
risk-averse	farmers	are	less	likely	to	insure.	In	this	study,	the	risk	preferences	of	famers	
were	 derived	 based	 on	 their	 responses,	 despite	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 risk	 preference	
measures	derived	from	surveys	(van	Winsen	2014).	For	example,	in	the	EU,	more	relia-
ble	measures	of	farmers’	risk	preferences	can	be	derived	from	FADN	data,	in	which	real	
production	 choices	 can	 be	 observed	 (Koundouri	 et	 al.	 2009).	 However,	 because	 this	
study	dealt	with	a	completely	new	product	for	farmers,	we	relied	on	a	hypothetical	set-
ting	and	risk	preferences	derived	from	farmers’	stated	responses.	If	crop	insurance	mar-
kets	 evolve	 in	 Finland,	 we	will	 obtain	more	 reliable	 estimates	 of	 farmers’	 risk	 prefer-
ences	by	using	data	that	are	collected	based	on	their	actual	crop	insurance	decisions.		
Three	out	of	the	four	articles	of	this	thesis	used	CE	as	a	research	method.	CE	values	
changes	in	a	good	or	policy	efficient	way	since	more	than	two	alternatives	are	examined	
at	 one	 time	 and	 respondents	 are	 forced	 to	 make	 choices	 between	 attributes.	 In	 this	
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research	 two	 different	 crop	 insurance	 choices	were	 studied	 against	 the	 option	 not	 to	
buy	crop	insurance	at	all.	Advantage	of	CE	in	the	modelling	process	is,	that	experimental	
design	of	CE	can	reduce	the	multi-collinearity	that	may	exist	between	attributes.	In	addi-
tion	with	CE	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 value	 changes	 in	 goods	 that	do	not	 exist	 (Bateman	et	 al.	
2002).	Therefore	CE	was	chosen	for	this	study,	as	crop	insurances	were	non-existent	in	
Finland.	In	addition	implicit	prices	were	derived,	which	is	one	of	the	biggest	advantages	
of	CE	method.		
Despite	its	multiple	benefits,	CE	has	also	limitations.	As	article	I	of	this	thesis	shows,	
derived	estimates	are	sensitive	to	study	design	i.e.	attributes	selection	and	levels	of	at-
tributes.	 In	addition	 some	attributes	 that	are	 important	 in	 respondents’	 selection	pro-
cess	may	be	excluded.	Choice	 task	may	also	be	 to	complex	 if	 too	many	attributes	and	
attribute	 levels	are	 shown.	 In	 this	 research	 the	actual	product	 studied	may	have	been	
too	 unknown	 for	 the	 respondents.	 This	 was	 somewhat	 controlled	 with	 description	 of	
attributes	before	 respondents	were	asked	 to	 complete	 the	 choices.	However,	 it	 is	 un-
known	how	this	affected	choices	made.	Results	from	article	I	showed	that	the	choice	of	
the	cost	vector	affected	the	results	significantly.	Thus	researchers	should	carefully	con-
sider	the	choice	of	price	range	in	CE	studies	applied	to	products	that	are	non-existent.		
There	is	no	common	policy	for	crop	damage	compensation	in	the	EU.	Recent	devel-
opment	 in	agricultural	markets	 calls	 for	more	 co-operation	 in	 crop	 insurance	between	
EU	 member	 countries.	 If	 the	 areas	 from	 which	 crop	 insurance	 products	 are	 sold	 are	
more	heterogeneous,	the	systemic	risks	can	be	reduced.	Moreover,	the	research	collab-
oration	 between	 different	 countries	 on	 agricultural	 risk	 management	 should	 be	
strengthened.	 This	 would	 build	 a	 common	 framework	 for	 future	 policies	 that	 aim	 at	
greater	resilience	in	EU	agriculture.		
Crop	insurances	were	non-existent	in	Finland	at	the	time	research	data	was	collect-
ed	for	this	study.	Now	two	insurance	companies	offer	crop	insurance	products	for	farm-
ers.	 In	 the	 future	as	 farmers	get	more	experience	on	crop	 insurance,	actual	purchases	
can	be	modelled.		
Risk	management	has	become	more	 important	 in	agriculture	as	climate	change	 is	
expected	 increase	 yield	 risks	 and	 price	 fluctuations	 have	 increased.	 In	 this	 study	 only	
crop	 insurances	were	 considered.	 Price	 risks	 are	 becoming	more	 severe	 for	 European	
farmers	and	the	need	for	effective	income	risk	management	instruments	are	becoming	
more	evident.	Research	on	risk	management	tools	concentrating	on	price	risks	is	needed	
in	Europe.	For	example	Income	Stabilisation	Tool	(IST)	introduced	in	the	recent	CAP	re-
form	have	attained	so	far	only	little	attention	in	agricultural	economics	research	(El	Ben-
ni	et	al.	2016,	Finger	&	El	Benni	2014,	Liesivaara	et	al.	2012).	However,	 it	may	well	be	
that	in	the	next	CAP	reform	in	2020	EU	wide	policy	for	income	risk	management	is	intro-
duced.	Research	has	an	important	role	in	finding	new	ways	to	handle	price	risks.	
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Appendices 
CE Attributes and attribute levels 
Crop	Insurance	attribute	 Levels	
Premium	 4,	8,	12,	16,	24,	32	Euros/hectare	
Deductible	 10,	20,	30	%	
Expected	compensation	 100,	300,	600	Euros/hectare	
Insurance	type	 Index	insurance,	Farm	specific	insurance	
	
Mixed logit model description and parameter values 
Results	presented	in	section	3.1	were	derived	with	mixed	logit	model.	Mixed	logit	prob-
abilities	 are	 the	 integrals	 of	 standard	 logit	 probabilities	 over	 a	 density	 of	 parameters.	
Formally:	
	𝑝!,! = !!!!!,!!!!!!,!!!!! , 
	
where	ƒ(β)	is	the	density	function,	which	gives	weights	to	the	mixed	logit	probabil-
ity.	 The	 parameters	 of	 the	 model	 was	 estimated	 with	 maximum	 simulated	 likelihood	
using	1,000	Halton	quasi-random	draws.	In	model	results	presented	in	section	3.1	a	tri-
angular	distribution	was	specified	for	the	premium	attribute.	Further	normal	distribution	
was	 specified	 for	 the	deductible	and	expected	compensation	attributes	and	a	uniform	
distribution	for	the	insurance-type	attribute.		
The	estimated	model	coefficients	are	not	interpretable	in	economic	terms.	In	order	
to	reveal	the	willingness	to	pay	for	a	product,	implicit	price	(IP)	estimates	are	calculated	
as:	
	𝐼𝑃! = − !!!! , 
where	βk	is	the	parameter	estimate	of	kth	attribute	and	βp	is	the	price	coefficient.	
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Mixed	logit	model	results.	
	 Parameter	estimate	 Standard	error	
Choice	experiment	attributes	 	 	
Premium	 -0.188***	 0.013	
Deductible	 -2.985***	 0.492	
Expected	compensation	 0.0063***	 0.0003	
Farm	insurance	 -0.573***	 0.103	
Random	parameter	estimates	 	 	
Premium	 0.327***	 0.028	
Deductible	 4.578***	 0.265	
Expected	compensation	 0.0047***	 0.0004	
Farm	insurance	 2.475***	 0.223	
Socioeconomic	variables	 	 	
Agea	 -0.043***	 0.013	
Cultivated	areab	 0.013***	 0.004	
Educationc	 1.093*	 0.588	
ASCd	 1.527*	 0.785	
Log-likelihood	 -3,694	 	
n	 5,790	 	
McFadden	Pseudo	R2	 0.419	 	
AIC	 7.412	 	
***p<0.01;	**p<0.05;	*p<0.1	
aAge	of	the	farmer	in	2012	
bCultivated	hectares	
cFarmer	has	higher	education	=	1	
dAlternative	specific	constant	refers	to	no	insurance	choice	
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Stochastic simulation model description	
Total	indemnities	I	of	the	area	yield	index	insurance	scheme	were	modelled	as	follows:	
	𝐼 𝛿 = 𝑝!𝑚𝑎𝑥 0, 𝛿!"ȳ!" − 𝑦!"!!!!!!!! ,  
	
where	p	is	the	average	price,	δ	is	the	deductible,	ȳ	is	average	area	yield	for	c	crop	in	
area	j	and	y	is	realised	area	yield.	In	the	model	y	is	the	stochastic	element.	Average	pric-
es	from	2009–2013	were	used.	In	addition	average	yields	from	1980	to	2013	were	used	
as	ȳ.	 In	 the	 simulation	model	area	yields	were	defined	 to	be	normally	distributed.	Re-
sults	 of	 the	 stochastic	 simulation	 model	 presented	 in	 section	 3.3	 are	 derived	 from	
10,000	iterations.	Also	correlations	between	area	yields	were	taken	into	account	in	the	
model	to	study	the	effect	of	systemic	yields.		
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